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Professor Akhil Reed Amar and Ms. Ren6e B. Lettow have
written a lively, provocative article that will keep many of us who
teach constitutional-criminal procedure busy for years to come.1
They present a reconception of the "first principles" of the Fifth
Amendment, and they suggest a dramatic reconstruction of criminal procedure. As a part of that reconstruction, they propose, inter
alia, that at a pretrial hearing presided over by a judicial officer, the
government should be empowered to compel a suspect, under penalty of contempt, to provide links in the chain of evidence needed
2
to convict him.
Under the Amar-Lettow proposal, a suspect brought to this pretrial hearing would only receive "testimonial immunity," that is,
protection against use of the specific testimony compelled from
him. He would not, however, be provided any protection against
derivative use - the use of his compelled testimony to search out
other sources of information that might furnish the means of convicting him, such as the whereabouts of damaging physical evidence
or the nunes and addresses of potential witnesses for the
prosecution.
More than a hundred years ago, in Counselman v. Hitchcock,3
the Court struck down a federal immunity statute because, as Justice Frankfurter later explained, the immunity grant "merely forbade the use of the testimony given and failed to protect a witness
from future prosecution based on knowledge and sources of information obtained from the compelled testimony."'4 If the AmarLettow view prevails, however, a witness in Counselman's plight
1. See Akhil Reed Amar & Ren6e B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The
Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. Rnv. 857 (1995).
2. See id. at 858-59, 898-901, 908-09, 926-27.
3. 142 U.S. 547 (1892). The case is discussed at considerable length infra in text accompanying notes 237-63.
4. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,437 (1956). Although the Counselman opinion
went on to say that an immunity grant is valid only when it affords "absolute immunity
against future prosecution for the offence to which the question relates," 142 U.S. at 586,
what may fairly be called the case's intermediate holding - what a later Court called its
"conceptual basis," see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) - was that the
Fifth Amendment protects against the derivative use, as well as the use, of compelled utterances. See infra text accompanying notes 251-61.
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would be held in contempt for refusing to reveal leads to extrinsic
evidence that could be used to convict him.
A quarter-century ago, in Kastigar v. United States,5 the Court
told us that protection against the use and derivative use of compelled testimony was coextensive with the scope of the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination. But Amar and Lettow tell
us that "use and derivative use immunity" is excessive; protection
against the use of the witness's own words is all that the Fifth
Amendment requires.
Although Amar and Lettow's conception of the Fifth Amendment is noteworthy, a judicially supervised interrogation proceeding is "an idea which has been part of the body of legal literature
for a long time."' 6 As I have discussed elsewhere,7 my former colleague, Paul Kauper, appears to have been the first commentator to
discuss at any substantial length the need for, the desirability of,
and the legal and practical problems raised by such a procedure.
Writing more than thirty years later - and nearly thirty years
before Amar and Lettow - Judges Walter Schaefer and Henry
Friendly, two of the most eminent critics of the Warren Court's
most controversial confession cases, Escobedo v. Illinois8 and Miranda v. Arizona,9 in effect returned to and built upon the 1932

Kauper proposal. 10
What I have called the "Kauper-Schaefer-Friendly plan" differs
in one important respect, however, from the Amar-Lettow proposal. Under the former proposal, the judicial officer could not hold a
suspect who refused to respond to questioning in contempt: "[tjhe
only sanction" for a suspect's silence was "to permit the trier of the
fact to consider that silence for whatever value it has in determining
5. 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The case is discussed at considerable length infra in text accompanying notes 268-79.
6. WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE SusPEcr AND Soc=ry: CIMINAL PROCEDURE AND
CONVERGING CONSTITUTIONAL DocrRim 78 (1967) (the text of lectures delivered shortly

before the Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
7. See Yale Kamisar, Kauper's "JudicialExamination of the Accused" Forty Years Later
- Some Comments on a RemarkableArticle, 73 MICrs. L. REv. 15,15 n.3 (1974), reprintedin
YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTMMOGATION AND CoNiFssioNs 77,77-78 n.1 (1980) (discussing
Paul G. Kauper, JudicialExamination of the Accused - A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30
MICH. L. REv. 1224 (1932)).
8. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. See SCHAEFR, supra note 6, at 76-81; Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for ConstitutionalChange, 37 U. CiN. L. REv. 671, 713 & n.180 (1968)
("endorsing" Justice Schaefer's proposal and noting "a rather similar proposal" by Professor
Kauper); see also Kamisar, supra note 7, at 93-94.
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guilt or innocence."" Moreover, in order to permit comment at
trial upon a suspect's silence during the judicially supervised interrogation, both Schaefer and Friendly assumed the need for, and
proposed, a constitutional amendment.' 2
Although their proposal is not linked to a ban against the use of
confessions obtained in the stationhouse, Amar and Lettow do say,
in an apparent effort to sweeten their proposal, that with the advent
of the judicially supervised interrogation procedure they favor,
"courts might well choose" to establish "a prophylactic rule that no
police-station confession by a defendant is ever allowed in, unless
volunteered by a suspect in the presence of an on-duty defense lawyer or ombudsman in the police station.' 3 The courts might
choose to create the prophylactic rule Amar and Lettow suggest,
but they also might choose not to create such a rule.
Although I think it quite unlikely that an absolute prohibition
against all police station confessions would ever go into effect, let us
suppose that somehow it did. What then? "[T]his strict regime,"
Amar and Lettow assure us, "would create powerful incentives to
conduct interrogation before magistrates rather than in police
stations."14
I think not - at least not if Amar and Lettow's way of thinking
about the Fifth Amendment were adopted. Amar and Lettow can't
have it both ways. If, as they maintain, "[o]nly the defendant's
compelled testimony should be protected by the [Fifth] Amendment"'15 - a view upon which their proposal depends - then only
the coerced or otherwise improperly obtained stationhouse confes11. ScHAEFER,supranote 6, at 80-81 (emphasis added); see also Kauper, supranote 7, at
1239, 1252, 1255.
12. See ScHAEFER, supra note 6, at 78, 80; Friendly, supra note 10, at 721-22; see also
Donald A. Dripps, Foreword. Against Police Interrogation- And the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 78 J. Cjm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 730-31 (1988); Phillip E. Johnson, A Statutory Replacement for the Miranda Doctrine, 24 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 303, 309 n.15 (1987);
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited. ConstitutionalLaw or JudicialFiat,26
WASHBURN LJ.1, 25 (1986).
13. Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 908-09. As for statements obtained by the police
"before stationhouse custody commences - at the scene of the crime, on the street comer,
in the squad car, and elsewhere," all that Amar and Lettow have to say is that "nice problems
will arise." Id.at 909. They will indeed. As Judge Friendly noted, "A declaration that the
privilege does not apply to questioning before arrival at the station obviously would not do;
the route from the place of apprehension would too often rival that supposedly taken by the
driver with a gullible foreigner in his cab." Friendly, supra note 10, at 715. But Friendly was
uncertain about how to deal with "the intermediate area of post-arrest, pre-station house
interrogation." Id.at 716.
14. Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 909.
15. Id.at 919.
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sions or incriminating statements,16 not their "fruits," would be protected by the Fifth Amendment.
But how can we expect to discourage the police from proceed-

ing in an irregular manner in the stationhouse when they know that
any evidence their improper questioning brings to light will be admissible? Unless the courts bar the use of the often-valuable evidence derived from an inadmissible confession, as well as the
a strong incentive to resort to
confession itself, there will remain
17
forbidden interrogation methods.
Implementing the Amar-Lettow judicially supervised interrogation plan would be no small undertaking. As Judge Friendly said of
a similar proposal, "the system would be fully effective only if an
was provided on a
adequate supply of magistrates and defenders
8
basis.'
7-days-a-week
24-hours-a-day,
I assume that the Amar-Lettow proposal, if implemented, would
take the form of a statute. I assume, further, that at some point the
Court would have to pass on the constitutionality of such a statute.
If the mood of the country were such that the Amar-Lettow proposal were to be enacted into law, and if the attitude of the Court
were such that it would uphold the statute, I very much doubt that
the Supreme Court or any state court would choose to mitigate the
impact of the statute by excluding all stationhouse confessions or
incriminating statements, even those said to be volunteered in the
absence of an on-duty defense lawyer.
Not even the otherwise-bold MirandaCourt was bold enough to
require law enforcement officers, whenever feasible, to make audio
16. Judge Schaefer, on the other hand, would exclude the fruits of improperly obtained
statements. After setting forth his proposal for judicially supervised interrogation, he adds:
"An additional safeguard is desirable... which places upon the prosecution the burden of
establishing that the evidence which it offers is not the product of any statement of the accused procured by improper means." ScHAEFER, supranote 6, at 81 (emphasis added).
At this point, Judge Schaefer cites to a footnote in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,
378 U.S. 52 (1964). This footnote informs us that in order to assure that the government does
not make use of compelled testimony or its fruits, once a defendant demonstrates that he has
testified under an immunity grant, the authorities "have the burden of showing that their
evidence is not tainted by establishing that they had an independent, legitimate source for the
disputed evidence." 378 U.S. at 79 n.18 (emphasis added).
17. Amar and Lettow do not question the "well-founded belief that... where the police
use forbidden means to obtain confessions, they do so more for the purpose of discovering
clues than for the purpose of manufacturing admissible evidence." MODEL CODE OF EviDEN E:Rule 505 cmt. c (1942), discussed in Austin W. Scott, Jr., FederalControl over Use of
Coerced Confessions in State Criminal Cases - Some Unsettled Problems, 29 IND. LJ. 151,
157 & n.32 (1954). For more recent observations to the same effect, see the quotations infra
in text accompanying note 328 and infra in note 329. Indeed, Amar and Lettow acknowledge
that "physical leads are often more important to law enforcement than getting statements for
use in court." Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 922 n.286 (footnote omitted).
18. Friendly, supra note 10, at 714-15.
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or video recordings of how the now-familiar warnings are delivered,
how the suspect responds, or how the questioning proceeds. 19 No
doubt the Warren Court was aware that such a requirement would
have added fuel to the criticism that it was overstepping its institutional authority - that it was "legislating."
But what Amar and Lettow suggest might happen - a judicially
imposed ban against the use of all confessions obtained in the police station, even those the police claim were "spontaneous" or
"volunteered," even those the police tape-recorded - would constitute a more naked exercise of judicial control over police practices than the restrictions the Miranda Court declined to impose on
the police for institutional reasons. Even a Justice who favored
such a sweeping prohibition as a matter of policy would likely balk
at imposing it as a matter of constitutional law.
If the political-legal climate were such that the Amar-Lettow
proposal for a judicially supervised interrogation procedure - enforced by the contempt power - were enacted into law and found
constitutional, legislatures and courts would most probably favor an
alternative, back-up scheme suggested by Amar and Lettow, one
the authors consider "compatible" with their general approach:
[E]ach suspect in custody could be told that he must be brought
before a magistrate and a lawyer within a short time (say, five hours)
and that he has an absolute right to remain silent until then; but he
should also understand that if he stands mute until then, a later jury
can be told of his pre-magistrate, pre-lawyer silence, and20might view
more skeptically any story he later tries to offer at trial.
This does not look like "an absolute right to remain silent" to
me. (Evidently some absolute rights are more absolute than
others.) If I understand this proposal correctly, a suspect would be
told he has an absolute right to remain silent, but also that if he
exercises this right and his case goes to trial, his silence can be used
against him. Can a police officer be trusted to explain to a suspect
how he can have a right to remain silent and still have his silence
used against him? And even if a police officer does his very best to
explain this, can the average suspect be expected to understand
it?21
19. Many commentators - and I am one of them - consider this a serious weakness in
Miranda. See YALE KAMiSAR, WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PRocEDUrE 541-42 (8th ed. 1994) (discussing this issue and citing authorities).
20. Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 909 (emphasis added).
21. The available empirical data indicate that a large number of police officers do not
give the silence or counsel warnings at all, and many who do give them fail to do so in a
meaningful way. Moreover, it appears that a significant percentage of suspects either misunderstand the existing warnings or fail to appreciate their significance. See Lawrence S.
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When we put these two pieces of their proposal together, Amar
and Lettow's conception of criminal procedure looks like this: (i)
police tell the suspect, before they bring him to a magistrate, that if
he does not speak to them, his silence may be used against him if
his case goes to trial; and (ii) the suspect is told, when he gets to the
magistrate, that if he does not provide answers, even though these
answers may lead the police to extrinsic evidence that can be used
to convict him, he will be held in contempt. That's quite a package
if you happen to be a police officer or a prosecutor.
I doubt that the practical problems involved in implementing
their proposal would matter much to Amar and Lettow. Their article focuses less on the remaking of criminal procedure and more on
the reconception of constitutional law. But even if their specific
proposals are not implemented, the Amar-Lettow view of the narrow scope of the protection provided by the Fifth Amendment
would still have far-reaching consequences for criminal procedure.
It would enable the government to hold a witness in contempt for
refusing to reveal leads that could, in turn, uncover evidence that
could be used later to convict him. It would enable the police to
make use of the often-valuable fruits of a coerced confession even
though they extracted the confession for the very purpose of discovering the existence and location of damaging physical evidence. In
short, the Amar-Lettow view would profoundly change the way in
which the government can exert its power against criminal suspects.
As the basis for giving the government this enhanced power and
as the foundation for their specific proposal for the judicially supervised compulsion of statements that would reveal sources of information that could later be used to convict a defendant, Amar and
Lettow maintain that "a person's (perhaps unreliable) compelled
pretrial statements can never be introduced against him in a criminal case but that reliable fruits of such statements virtually always
Leiken, Police Interrogationin Colorado: The Implementationof Miranda, 47 DEWy. LJ.1,
15-16, 33 (1970); Richard J. Medalie et al., Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's
Capitak The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MIcH. L. REv. 1347, 1375 (1968); Project-,
Interrogationsin New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1550-52, 1571-72,
1613-15 (1967). Against this background, how can anyone suggest that we make the Miranda
warnings more complicated, yet continue to rely on the uncorroborated oral testimony of the
police?
Actually, the Amar-Lettow proposal would lead not only to a revised Miranda warning
but to a much shortened one. The suspect would not be told of his right to counsel - either
his own or one provided by the government - before or during any questioning because he
would not have such a right at the "pre-magistrate, pre-lawyer" stage. But he would be told
that "he must be brought before a magistrate and a lawyer within a short time (say, five
hours)." Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 909 (emphasis added).
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can be." 22 In this essay, I shall examine and respond to this argument, paying special attention to Amar and Lettow's claim that current doctrines or trends support their contention.
I.

RELIABILITY AS A "FIRST PrNcIPLE"

At the center of Amar and Lettow's argument is the idea that
the privilege against self-incrimination is concerned with reliability.
In arguing for the admissibility of "the physical fruits" of coerced
confessions because they are "quite reliable and often highly probative,"'23 Amar and Lettow observe:
[Courts and commentators have stressed that coerced statements are
unreliable, and that the privilege therefore serves the goal of reliability. This is indeed a worthy goal, and courts have increasingly empha-

sized it over the past three decades. But if this
is the touchstone,
24
again the scope of immunity today is too broad.

I think it far more accurate to say that in recent decades courts
and commentators have downplayed the unreliability of a coerced
or "involuntary" confession as the reason for excluding it.25 I be22. Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 858; see also id. at 919 ("Schmerber was right to
emphasize the distinction between testimony and physical evidence, but later decisions have
failed to follow its logic to the end. Only the defendant's compelled testimony should be
protected by the [Fifth] Amendment."). In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the
Court upheld the taking of a blood sample of an injured person by a physician, at police
direction, over the person's objection. The case is discussed at considerable length infra in
text accompanying notes 112-37.
23. Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 895.
24. Id. (footnote omitted).
25. Some twenty-eight pages after making the statement quoted above, Amar and Lettow
tell us that Judge Friendly "noted that the main motivation behind extending the privilege
[against self-incrimination] to informal proceedings must have been 'the truly dreadful risk of
the false confession."' Id. at 923 (emphasis added). What Judge Friendly actually said was
that "a prime motive for extending the privilege to out-of-court proceedings must have been
the Court's belief that the traditional due process approach did not sufficiently protect
against the truly dreadful risk of the false confession." HmNY J. FRmNDLY, A Postscripton
Miranda, in BENCHMARKS 266, 281-82 (1967) (emphasis added). At this point, Judge
Friendly specifically refers to n. 24 of the Mirandaopinion, where Chief Justice Warren notes
that then-current police interrogation practices - which the Court found to be at odds with
the privilege against self-incrimination - "may even give rise to a false confession." 384 U.S.
at 455 n.24 (emphasis added). N. 24 then discusses People v. Whitmore, 257 N.Y.S.2d 787
(Sup. Ct. 1965), revd., 278 N.Y.S.2d 706 (App. Div. 1967), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 956 (1972), a
New York case where a person of limited intelligence confessed to various crimes that he did
not commit.
As Professor Schulhofer has pointed out, "the core of Miranda" is that informal pressure
to speak can constitute compulsion within the meaning of the privilege and that this element
of informal compulsion is present in any custodial police interrogation. See Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 435,436 (1987). The MirandaCourt
relegates to a footnote the point that this informal compulsion may also - "may even," to
use the Court's words - produce a false confession. With all respect, I think Judge Friendly
is making a mountain out of a footnote.
It may be true that the then-recent Whitmore case, which was a dreadful episode, gave the
Court another reason or an extra incentive to extend the privilege to out-of-court proceed-
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lieve that the various judicial opinions, books, and articles I shall
quote from in the next few pages establish inescapably that this is
so. Consequently, the "first principles" that courts have defined for
the Fifth Amendment are quite different from the ones Amar and
Lettow assert.
A.

The Reasons for Excluding Coerced Confessions

To be sure, the "voluntariness" test started out as a rule protecting against the danger of untrustworthy confessions. It is also true
that for a long time thereafter the rule that a confession was admissible so long as it was "voluntary" was more or less an alternative
statement of the rule that a confession was admissible so long as
it was free of influence that made it unreliable or "probably
untrue."

26

During the period roughly extending to the 1950s, physical evidence uncovered as a result of an involuntary confession was, unsurprisingly, admissible - because the derivative evidence, unlike
the confession, was reliable.27 Indeed, "it was generally held that if
ings. But I do not think such speculation constitutes much support for the Amar-Lettow
view that the unreliability of a coerced confession is the touchstone for its inadmissibility.
Certainly, Chief Justice Warren, author of the Miranda opinion, did not think so. Six years
earlier, the Court, again speaking through the Chief Justice, had pointed out:
The Fourteenth Amendment forbids "fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence,
whether true or false." Consequently, we have rejected the argument that introduction
of an involuntary confession is immaterial where other evidence establishes guilt or corroborates the confession. As important as it is that persons who have committed crimes
be convicted, there are considerations which transcend the question of guilt or
innocence.
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199,206 (1960) (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219,
236 (1941)) (citations omitted).
26. See generally CHARLs
T. McCo.MIcK, EViDENCE 226 (1st ed. 1954); 3 JoHN HENY
WIGMORE, A TREATIsE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYsTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRiALs AT

COMMON LAW

§ 822

(3d ed. 1940).

27. See, e.g., 2 H.C. UNDERHILL, A TREATIsE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 404
(Philip F. Herrick ed., 5th ed. 1956); 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 357-58 (Ronald A. Anderson ed., 12th ed. 1955); 3 WIGMORE, supra note 26,
§§ 856-59.
Amar and Lettow note that some thirty-five years ago I stated that when a coerced confession leads to the uncovering of physical evidence, the lower courts usually admit such
evidence. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 917 n.265. I did say that. See Yale Kamisar,
Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and FederalCourts, 43 MINN.
L. Rnv. 1083,1115 n.109 (1959). But Amar and Lettow do not point out that I was criticizing
the rule - that I was arguing that a rule admitting the fruits of a coerced confession could
not be reconciled with the new rationale for excluding coerced confessions. See id.at 1115.
As I wrote in the same footnote referred to by Amar and Lettow:
[I]f one of the purposes of the confession doctrine is to protect individuals from "coercive" practices, regardless of the truth or falsity of the particular confession obtained as a
result, then "not only would confessions resulting from such practices be excluded, but
any evidence gained as a 'fruit' of the confession [would be denied admission]....
Otherwise police and prosecuting authorities will be not inhibited from carrying on 'coercive' practices."
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the extrinsic evidence corroborated the confession... even the confession could be admitted." 28
This practice may jolt modem students of criminal procedure.
But the courts that followed it had a certain logic on their side.
Amar and Lettow ask why we should exclude the physical fruits of
a coerced confession when these fruits are quite reliable. But if, as
they assert, reliability is the touchstone, why exclude the coerced
confession itself when corroborating evidence produced by the confession dispels any doubts about the truth of what the defendant
had confessed?
Untrustworthiness is no longer the sole, or even the principal,
reason for excluding coerced or involuntary confessions. In the
three decades between the time the Supreme Court decided its first
Fourteenth Amendment due process coerced confession case,
Brown v. Mississippi,29 and the time it handed down Miranda v.
Arizona,30 the Court continued to talk of "voluntary" and "involuntary" confessions - but the meaning of these elusive terms
31
changed quite significantly.
As Roger Traynor, then Chief Justice of the California Supreme
Court, asserted, "[e]ven the earliest [Fourteenth Amendment involuntary confession] cases adumbrate an enlarged test of due process
transcending the simple one of untrustworthiness. '32 By the 1950s
it had become fairly clear that the Court was applying two constitutional standards for the admissibility of confessions. Some commentators described these standards as "a privilege against
evidence illegally obtained" and "an overlapping rule of incompetency." 33 Others referred to them as "a large element of official
Yale Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal

Courts, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1083, 1115 n.109 (1959) (quoting with approval Comment, Material
Witnesses and "Involuntary" Confessions, 17 U. Cln. L. Rv. 706, 715-16 (1950)).
28. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAioNMENT PROCEDURE § 150A cmt. at 410 (Am. Law

Inst., Proposed Official Draft 1975) (footnote omitted); JOHN MAcARTHUR MAoUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GULT

RESTRICTIONS UPON is DIsCOVERY OR COMPULsORY DisCLOsuRE 126-

27 & n.19 (1959) (noting that some state courts admit the entire confession or at least those
parts specifically corroborated when the confession receives "circumstantial verification," but
questioning whether this rule could be squared with the rationale of recent Supreme Court
cases); see also supra note 27 (citing authorities).
29. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).

30. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
31. See Yale Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Confession?, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 728,
741-47 (1963), reprinted in KAMusAR, supra note 7, at 1, 10-15.
32. Roger J.Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and
Tria; 33 U. Ci-n. L. REv. 657, 665 (1966) (pre-Miranda).
33. Charles T. McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEXAs L.

REv. 447, 457 (1938); see also McCoRMICK, supra note 26, at 154-57.
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discipline" and a concern over "credibility risks." 34 Still others

identified a "police methods" test and a "trustworthiness" test.35
As the voluntariness test continued to evolve in the middle part
of the twentieth century, the results reached by the Court seemed

to reflect less a concern with the reliability of a particular confession than disapproval of police interrogation tactics considered offensive or subject to serious abuse. 36 On the eve of Miranda, as
Illinois Supreme Court Justice Walter Schaefer noted at the time,
the concern about unreliability "still exert[ed] some influence in coerced confession cases ...

but it ha[d] ceased to be the dominant

consideration." 37
The most emphatic articulation of the view that untrustworthiness was no longer the principal reason for excluding a coerced or
involuntary confession may be found in Rogers v. Richmond.38 In
that case the defendant had confessed to a murder only after the
police had threatened to bring his ailing wife to the stationhouse for
questioning. The state trial judge took the position that a police
stratagem " 'which has no tendency to produce a confession except
one in accordance with the fruth does not render the confession
inadmissible,' ',39 and the defendant's confession was admitted.
In the course of overturning the conviction, the Supreme Court
emphasized that "a legal standard which took into account the circumstances of [a confession's] probable truth or falsity" did not satisfy the Due Process Clause. The Court held that the admissibility
of a confession should be determined by focusing on whether the
police interrogation methods were such "as to overbear petitioner's
will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined
a question to be answered with complete disregard of whether
'40
or not petitioner in fact spoke the truth.
34. MAotuw, supra note 28, at 127; see also id. at 109.
35. Monrad G. Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degre 6 STAN. L.
REv. 411, 429 (1954).
36. See Francis A. Allen, The Supreme Cour4 Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal
Justice, 8 DEPAUL L. REv. 213, 235 (1959). Professor Allen refers specifically to Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), but I think his observation is even more applicable to more
recent cases such as Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U.S. 199 (1960); and Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
37. ScHAE-ER, supra note 6, at 10 (based on a lecture delivered before Miranda). "Indeed," added Justice Schaefer, "the Supreme Court has sometimes insisted upon the exclusion of confessions whose reliability was not at all in doubt." Id. at 10-11.
38. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
39. 365 U.S. at 542.
40. 365 U.S. at 543-44.
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Writing for a 7-2 majority, in one of the last of his many opinions on the subject, Justice Frankfurter observed more generally:
Our decisions under [the Fourteenth] Amendment have made clear
that convictions following the admission into evidence of confessions
which are involuntary... cannot stand. This is so not because such
confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to
extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our
criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system .... [I]n many of the cases in which the command of the Due
Process Clause has compelled us to reverse state convictions involving
the use of confessions obtained by impermissible methods, independent corroborating evidence left little doubt of the truth of what the
defendant had confessed. Despite such verification, confessions were
found to be the product of constitutionally impermissible methods in
their inducement. Since a defendant had been subjected to pressures
to which, under our accusatorial system, an accused should not be
subjected, we were constrained to find that the procedures leading to
his conviction had failed to afford him that due process of law which
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. 41
I share the view that Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Rogers
"sound[ed] the death knell of the rule of 'trustworthiness.' "42 I
agree, too, that Rogers "made certain what had been strongly intimated in several earlier cases... namely, that the due process exclusionary rule for confessions (in much the same way as the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule for physical evidence) is also intended to deter improper police conduct." 43
If courts permitted the use of physical evidence discovered by
means of an involuntary confession as a corollary (I almost said
"fruit") of the once-dominant view that involuntary confessions are
excluded because of their presumed untrustworthiness - not because of any wrong done to the defendant or any lawlessness on the
part of the police - it is hard to see how or why the rule permitting
the use of such evidence should survive the repudiation of the trustworthiness rationale for excluding confessions. As the commentary
to the American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure observed twenty years ago:
In recent years... the Supreme Court has made it clear that coerced
confessions must be excluded not only because of their unreliability,
41. 365 U.S. at 540-41. For other emphatic statements of the police-methods rationale
for excluding involuntary or coerced confessions, see Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77,
385-86 (1964), and Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 485 (1972).
42. Ohns H. STEPHENS, JR., TmE SuRENmE COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 117

(1973).
43. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRA,

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2, at 443

(1984) (footnote omitted).
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but also because the methods used to obtain such confessions are intolerable and involve compulsion prohibited by the Constitution....
In view of this expanded basis for excluding confessions, the justification for the automatic admission of all "fruits" becomes greatly attenuated. If the use of an illegally obtained confession constitutes
compelled self-incrimination, so may the use of evidence derived from
the confession. And, if the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unacceptable police behavior, then the exclusion of fruits may also
be necessary to achieve this deterrence. There would seem to be no
rational basis for distinguishing between products of an illegal search
as opposed to products of an illegally obtained statement in terms of
applicability of the fruits doctrine.44
Justice Frankfurter "often adjured us to attend well to the question: 'On the question you ask depends the answer you get.' "45
When Amar and Lettow assume that reliability is the touchstone
for the admissibility of confessions and ask, "Why exclude the physical fruits of confessions, when these are quite reliable ...?-46 they

get the answer they want - but only because they ask the wrong
question. And they ask the wrong question because they start from
the wrong premise.
What are the right questions? I submit they are questions such
as these: If we prohibit the use of coerced confessions in large measure because the police who obtain such confessions "have engaged
in forbidden conduct of a most serious kind and will not be permitted to keep the advantage of it,"4 7 why should the government be

allowed to keep the advantage of the often valuable physical evidence derived from such confessions? If condemnation and deterrence of offensive police interrogati6n methods constitute a
principal reason for barring the resulting confessions - the socalled police methods test for excluding confessions - is disapproval or discouragement of objectionable police methods likely to
be taken seriously by law enforcement officials or the public if
physical evidence derived indirectly from such methods is used to
convict a defendant?
44. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 150.4, cmt. at 410-11 (Am. Law
Inst., Proposed Official Draft 1975).
45. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, Mr. JusticeFrankfurter,in BENCHMARKS, supra note 25, at 31819 (footnote omitted).
46. Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 895.
47. Paulsen, supranote 35, at 428. Professor Paulsen was among the first commentators
to call attention to the emerging police methods rationale for the admissibility of confessions.
See also Francis A. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 IL. L. REv. 1, 26-29 (1950); Bernard D. Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The
Allocation of ResponsibilityBetween Judge andJury, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 317,343, 348 (1954).

HeinOnline -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 941 1994-1995

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 93:929

Justice Frankfurter, the leading proponent of the police methods
test for admitting confessions48 - an approach that gained ascendancy at least thirty-five years ago 49 - once remarked, "To remove
the inducement to resort to [interrogation methods that violate
'fundamental notions of fairness and justice'] this Court has repeatedly denied use of the fruits of [such] illicit methods. 50o Justice
Frankfurter was speaking of the "first generation" fruits of illicit
police interrogation methods (the coerced confessions themselves),
not the "second generation" fruits (the evidence derived from such
confessions).5 1 But why shouldn't the police methods rationale apply to second generation fruits as well? Assuming that the secondary fruits of intolerable police interrogation methods would not
have been discovered in any other way, why shouldn't they be
barred along with the primary fruits, or the confessions themselves?
As Amar and Lettow note, the admissibility of physical evidence derived from a coerced confession is an issue that, surprisingly, the Court has never explicitly addressed.52 But a year after
Rogers was handed down, the Supreme Court of California did ad48. See the quotations from Justice Frankfurter's opinions infra in note 54 and accompanying text and infra in text accompanying note 104.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 37-44.
50. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 607 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
51. For use of this terminology, see Pitler, supra note *. Professors LaFave and Israel
explain:
In the simplest of exclusionary rule cases, the challenged evidence is quite clearly "direct" or "primary" in its relationship to the prior arrest, search, interrogation, [or] lineup
.... Not infrequently, however, challenged evidence is "secondary" or "derivative" in
character. This occurs when, for example, a confession is obtained after an illegal arrest
[or] physical evidence is located after an illegally obtained confession .... In these
situations, it is necessary to determine whether the derivative evidence is "tainted" by
the prior constitutional or other violation.
1 LAFAvE & IsRAEL, supra note 43, § 9.3(a), at 734.
52. Amar and Lettow observe that there seems to be "no U.S. Supreme Court case...
that actually excludes physical fruits of a coerced confession." Amar & Lettow, supranote 1,
at 917 n.265. I agree. But Amar and Lettow might have added that there does not appear to
be any Supreme Court case actually admitting the physical fruits of a coerced confession
either.
Interestingly, in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), which upheld use and
derivative use immunity, as opposed to transactional immunity, the Court assumed that the
fruits of a coerced confession had to be excluded along with the confession itself. Indeed, in
upholding use and derivative use immunity, the Court drew an analogy to coerced confessions. See infra text accompanying note 284. Eight years earlier, concurring in Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), Justice White, joined by Justice Stewart, had
assumed the same thing. See 378 U.S. at 92 (White, J., concurring); see also infra text accompanying notes 170-72.
For a discussion of possible reasons why the Court never specifically addressed the question whether the fruits of a coerced confession are admissible, see infra text accompanying
notes 289-304. It should be noted that the Court did apply the poisonous tree doctrine to
confessions inadmissible on grounds other than coercion. See infra text accompanying notes
318-50.
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dress it - and concluded that "the reason for the-common law rule
permitting the introduction of real evidence discovered by means of
an involuntary confession... must now be deemed constitutionally
indefensible. '53 The court explained:
It appears to us... that if it offends "the community's sense of fair
play and decency" to convict a defendant by evidence extorted from
him in the form of an involuntary confession, that sense of fair play
and decency is no less offended when a defendant is convicted by real
evidence which the police have discovered essentially by virtue of having extorted such a confession. If the one amounts to a denial of a fair
trial and due process of law, so must the other. If the one is the inadmissible product of "police procedure which violates the basic notions
of our accusatorial mode of prosecuting crime," so must the other be.
It does not appear that we can draw a constitutionally valid distinction between the two.54

Amar and Lettow might retort that whatever the Supreme
Court had to say about the "due process"-"totality of circumstances"-"voluntariness" test in the 1950s and early 1960s no
longer matters because in the 1964 case of Malloy v. Hogan,5 5 performing "what might have seemed to some a shotgun wedding ''of6
the privilege [against self-incrimination] to the confessions rule, 5
the Court informed us that "wherever a question arises whether a
confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by [the self-incrimination] portion of the Fifth
Amendment."

57

But if the privilege against self-incrimination, rather than general due process, controls the admissibility of the physical fruits of a
coerced confession, this should provide no comfort to Amar and
Lettow. Ever since the 100-year-old Counselman case was decided,
53. People v. Ditson, 369 P.2d 714,727 (Cal. 1962), vacated as moo4 371 U.S. 541 (1963).
54. 369 P.2d at 727 (citation omitted). The first inner quote comes from Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952), which is
discussed at considerable length infra in text accompanying notes 84-89, 104. According to
the Rochin Court, "Use of involuntary verbal confessions ... is constitutionally obnoxious
not only because of their unreliability. They are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause
even though statements contained in them may be independently established as true. Coerced confessions offend the community's sense of fair play and decency." 342 U.S at 173.
The second inner quote comes from Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in Watts
v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949):
In holding that the Due Process Clause bars police procedure which violates the basic
notions of our accusatorial mode of prosecuting crime and vitiates a conviction based on
the fruits of such procedure, we apply the Due Process Clause to its historic function of
assuring appropriate procedure before liberty is curtailed or life is taken.
338 U.S. at 55.
55. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
56. Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation,25
Omo ST. L.J. 449, 465 (1964).
57. 378 U.S. at 7 (quoting Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897)).
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the Court has viewed the privilege against self-incrimination as
prohibiting indirect or derivative use, as well as direct use, of compelled utterances.58 Thus, whether one views (i) a ban on the derivative use of coerced confessions as a corollary of the police methods
rationale for excluding confessions; or (ii) the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine as applying to violations of the Fifth Amendment
as well as the Fourth; or (iii) the Fifth Amendment exclusionary
rule as containing its own "built-in" poisonous tree doctrine - a
plausible way, I think, of reading Counselman and its progeny5 9 the result is the same. The physical fruits of a coerced confession
are, or should be, excluded.
General due process may still govern the admissibility of physical evidence derived from coerced confessions. As the Court
pointed out two decades after Malloy and Miranda: "even after
holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination applies in the context of custodial interrogations
and is binding on the States, the Court has continued to measure
confessions against the requirements of due process. '60 In measuring confessions against the requirement of due process, moreover,
the post-MirandaCourt has left little doubt that the primary consideration is not the reliability of the challenged confession but the
legality and acceptability of the police interrogation methods that
elicited it. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts may not have given
the defense-minded a great deal to cheer about, but they have reaffirmed and reinvigorated the police methods rationale for excluding
coerced or "involuntary" confessions.
Miller v. Fenton61 rejected the argument that a state court determination of a confession's voluntariness is a factual issue within the
meaning of the rule providing that state courts' findings of facts
shall be presumed to be correct in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Whether the challenged confession was obtained "in a manner that comports with due process," 62 is, rather, "a legal question
requiring independent federal determination." 63 Justice O'Connor,
who wrote the opinion of the Court, looked back on various cases
58. See infra text accompanying notes 237-61.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 275-79.
60. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985) (citations omitted); see also Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986) ("The Court has retained this due process focus, even
after holding, in Malloy v. Hogan, that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination applies to the States." (citation omitted)).
61. 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
62. 474 U.S. at 110 (emphasis added).
63. 474 U.S. at 110.
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that had banned the use of coerced confessions and described them
as holding that "certain interrogationtechniques, either in isolation
or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect,
are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be
condemned under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 64
Michigan v. Tucker 6s dismayed supporters of Miranda because
the Court sharply distinguished between the "procedural rules" or
"prophylactic standards" laid down in Miranda and "genuine" or
"actual" infringements of the Fifth Amendment 66 - thus "clearly
sever[ing Miranda] from the privilege against compelled selfincrimination." 67 But when then Justice Rehnquist, the author of
the Tucker opinion, looked back at the pre-Miranda voluntariness
doctrine and explained why coerced or involuntary confessions
were excluded from evidence, he employed what I think it fair to
call police methods rationale terminology:
64. 474 U.S. at 109 (emphasis added). Immediately after quoting Rogers v. Richmond
with approval, Justice O'Connor added: "[A]ccordingly, tactics for eliciting inculpatory statements must fall within the broad constitutional boundaries imposed by the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of fundamental fairness." 474 U.S. at 110 (emphasis added).
65. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
66. See 417 U.S. at 440-46. Tucker upheld the admissibility of the testimony of a witness
whose identity had been revealed by a statement obtained from the defendant in violation of
Miranda. In rejecting the contention that the poisonous tree doctrine should bar the testimony because the police never would have learned of the witness's existence but for their
unlawful questioning, Justice Rehnquist implied that the doctrine applies only to constitutional violations: "[Tjhe police conduct at issue here did not abridge [the defendant's] constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed only from the
prophylactic standards laid down by this Court in Mirandato safeguard that privilege." 417
U.S. at 445-46.
I share Professor (now Provost) Stone's conclusion that the view that a violation of the
Self-Incrimination Clause occurs only if a confession is "involuntary" under pre-Miranda
standards "is an outright rejection of the core premises of Miranda" and "is flatly inconsistent with the Court's declaration in Mirandathat '[t]he requirement of warnings and waiver
of rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege."' Geoffrey R.
Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Cour4 1977 Sup. Cr.REv. 99, 118-19 (quoting
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966)). For additional criticism of Tucker, see Yale
Kamisar, The "Police Practice" Phases of the CriminalProcess and the Three Phases of the
Burger Court in Tim BURGER YEARS 143, 151-53 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987); Larry J.
Ritchie, Compulsion that Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition, 61
MIN. L. REv. 383,416-18 (1977); David Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends
and Countertrends, 13 Loy. U. Cm. U.J. 405, 423-429 (1982).
Although Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Tucker has been strongly criticized,
it is fairly clear that a majority of the present Court subscribes to Tucker's way of thinking
about Miranda. In both her concurring opinion in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984)
and her majority opinion in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), Justice O'Connor relied
heavily on the distinction the Tucker Court drew between violations of Miranda'sprophylactic rules and actual infringements of the Fifth Amendment. See infra text accompanying
notes 180-83, 187-89, 201.
67. Stone, supra note 66, at 123.
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In state cases the Court applied the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, examining the circumstances of interrogation to
determine whether the processes were so unfair or unreasonable as to
render a subsequent confession involuntary. Where the state's actions
offended the standards offundamentalfairnessunder the Due Process
Clause, the State was68then deprived of the right to use the resulting
confessions in court.
More recently, in Colorado v. Connelly,69 a case upholding the
admissibility of a confession made by a suspect who was obeying
the "voice of God," Chief Justice Rehnquist, again speaking for the
Court, underscored the absence of police wrongdoing and dismissed the possibility that the respondent's confession might be
"quite unreliable": "[T]he cases considered by this Court over the
50 years since Brown v. Mississippi have focused upon the crucial
'70
element of police overreaching.
The Chief Justice added:
[S]uppressing respondent's statements would serve absolutely no purpose in enforcing constitutional guarantees. The purpose of excluding
evidence seized in violation of the Constitution is to substantially deter future violations of the Constitution....
A statement rendered by one in the condition of respondent
might be proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "The aim of the
requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false eviunfairness in the use of evidence,
dence, but to prevent fundamental
'71
whether true of false."
...

Although the Connelly Court's view of the due processvoluntariness test strengthens my argument, I must say I believe the
Court overstated the police methods rationale in that case. I share
the view that "a total deconstitutionalization of traditionally important reliability issues is unjustified." 72 Nevertheless, the Connelly
case is striking evidence of the subordinaterole reliability has come
to have in the due process confession cases.
Amar and Lettow's argument for admitting the physical fruits of
coerced confessions makes sense if, as they assert, the reliability or
68. 417 U.S. at 441 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
69. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
70. 479 U.S. at 163.
71. 479 U.S. at 166-67 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219,236 (1941)) (citation
omitted).
72. George E. Dix, FederalConstitutionalConfession Law: The 1986 and 1987 Supreme
Court Terms, 67 TEXAS L. Rlv. 231, 276 (1988); see also Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for
Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness Doctrinein HistoricalPerspective, 67 WAsH.
U. L.Q. 59, 139-43 (1989).
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unreliability of a confession is the touchstone for its admissibility.
But how can they make that claim in light of the strong language to
the contrary in the much-quoted Rogers case - a case they never
mention? Amar and Lettow assert further that in recent decades
the courts have "increasingly emphasized" the "reliability" rationale for the admissibility of confessions. 73 How they can make that
claim in the face of Connelly -

another case they never mention

-

also escapes me.
At first glance, the Amar-Lettow approach to coerced confessions looks like a reasonable compromise: keep out the confession
itself, but let in the valuable evidence the confession turns up.
However, once we understand that the dominant consideration in
coerced confession cases is not the exclusion of unreliable evidence
but disapproval and discouragement of the unacceptable police
methods that produced it, the Amar-Lettow "compromise" makes
little sense.
According to Professors Dershowitz and Ely, "there is no reason to expect an exclusionary rule to deter deliberate violations unless it has eliminated all significant incentives toward that
conduct." 74 But if the Amar-Lettow approach were to prevail, the
substantial chance that objectionable interrogation methods would
lead to the discovery of valuable evidence would furnish police interrogators with a significant incentive to utilize such methods.75
Amar and Lettow might dismiss this point as reflecting an
overly cynical view of police decisionmaking. But, as Professors
Dershowitz and Ely have noted, prohibitions against the use of ilegaily seized evidence and coerced confessions rest on the assumption that police officers "will act on the basis of a calculation of
advantages rather than out of desire to follow the law." 76 Otherwise, there would be little or no need for exclusionary rules.
Short of admitting coerced confessions in every case, there are
two ways to encourage the police to resort to unconstitutional inter73. Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 895.
74. Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L. 1198, 1219
(1971).
75. Cf. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (excluding incriminating statements obtained from an illegally arrested suspect even though, before making the statements, the suspect had been given the Mirandawarnings and had waived his Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights). The Brown Court pointed out that to admit the statements under the circumstances
would motivate the police to make illegal arrests "encouraged by the knowledge that evidence derived therefrom could well be made admissible at trial by the simple expedient of
giving Mirandawarnings." 422 U.S. at 602 (footnote omitted).
76. Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 74, at 1221.
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rogation methods: (i) let them know that if and when coerced confessions are corroborated by reliable physical evidence, the
confessions themselves are rendered admissible; or (ii) let them
know that even though the coerced confessions themselves cannot
be admitted, the reliable evidence these confessions bring to light
can be. Amar and Lettow reject the first alternative - or accept
the fact that the Fifth Amendment requires rejection of the first
alternative - yet they adopt the second. The second alternative,
however, is almost as inconsistent with the police methods rationale
for excluding confessions as the first. The second alternative enables the police to accomplish indirectly what they could not
achieve directly. The second alternative puts police who engage in
forbidden interrogation methods in a better position than they
would have been in if they had obeyed the law.77
As noted earlier, there was a time when, if the reliable evidence
brought to light by a coerced confession corroborated the confession, the courts admitted both the confession and the derivative evidence. Such an approach, at least, was internally consistent. Amar
and Lettow's approach is not.
If, as the Court has told us again and again, the touchstone for
the admissibility of confessions is not unreliability78 but the offensiveness of the police methods that produced the confession, then
neither the confession produced by such methods nor the evidence
derived from the confession should be admitted. The reliability of
the derivative evidence should no more bleach its stains of illegality
than should the reliability of the confession.
We are not talking about violations of what the Court has called
Miranda's nonconstitutional prophylactic procedures. 79 We are
talking about confessions produced by police methods that "offend
the community's sense of fair play and decency" 8 0 - about interrogation techniques "so offensive to a civilized system of justice that
they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause." 81
77. The justification for the "independent source" and "inevitable discovery" exceptions
to the poisonous tree doctrine, on the other hand, is that if the derivative evidence "has been
discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation" or "inevitably
would have been discovered by lawful means," the government should be put "in the same,
not a worse, position [than] they would have been if no police error or misconduct had occurred." Nix v. Williams (Williams II), 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984).

78. See supra text accompanying notes 37-44, 62-64, 68-71.
79. See, eg., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985).
80. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952).
81. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985).
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Unfortunately, more than sixty years after the Wickersham
Commission exposed the ugly facts of the "third degree," 82 "welldocumented evidence of interrogation violenc... persists to this
day."83 We should make every effort to stamp out such practices.
We should formulate rules that maximize the possibility that such
practices will become a thing of the past.
The Amar-Lettow proposal does not do that. What they offer is
a half-hearted exclusionary rule - a rule that sends conflicting
messages to law enforcement officers.
B. The Need To Bar the PhysicalFruits of a Constitutional
Violation: Variations on the Rochin Case
Although Rochin v. Califomia,84 the famous (or infamous)
"stomach pumping" case, did not involve any derivative evidence, I
think it provides a useful point of departure for underscoring the
need to exclude the physical fruits of a constitutional violation. The
case arose as follows: Upon entering the defendant's home illegally
and forcing open the door to his bedroom, police officers noticed
two capsules lying on a bedside table. When asked about the capsules, the defendant placed them in his mouth. The police struggled
to open the defendant's mouth and remove what was there, but the
defendant managed to swallow the capsules. Frustrated by the defendant's attempts to thwart their efforts, the police handcuffed him
and took him to a hospital, where an emetic solution was forced
into his stomach against his will. This "stomach pumping" produced the two capsules, which contained morphine. Largely on the
evidence, the defendant was convicted of a narcotics
basis of this
85
violation.
Without a dissent,86 the Court held that the conviction "ha[d]
87
been obtained by methods that offend the Due Process Clause"
82. See NAT.. COMMN. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, PuB. No. 11, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS
iN LAw ENFORCEMENT (1931).

83. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Fifth Amendment at Justice: A Reply, 54 U. Cm. L REv.
950, 956 (1987) (footnote omitted). For specitic examples, see Schulhofer, supra note 25, at
448 n.26 and Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to ProfessorCaplan, 39 VAND.L.
REv. 1, 13-14 & n.73 (1986).
84. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
85. 342 U.S. at 166.
86. Justices Black and Douglas wrote separate concurring opinions, maintaining that the
police had violated the defendant's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. But the
privilege had not yet been deemed applicable to the states and, in any event, the prevailing
view was that the privilege did not afford direct protection against nontestimonial
compulsion.
87. 342 U.S. at 174.
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by methods that disregard "certain decencies of civilized conduct" and "offend 'a sense of justice.' 88 To "sanction" the police
misconduct that produced the morphine capsules that led to defendant's conviction, observed Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the
opinion of the Court, "would be to afford brutality the cloak of
law." 89
Let us change the facts of Rochin as follows:
When the police illegally enter Rochin's home and burst into his
bedroom, they observe two keys lying on a bedside table. The defendant grabs the keys and puts them in his mouth. A struggle ensues, but the defendant manages to swallow the keys. The police
ultimately retrieve them, however, by taking the defendant to a
hospital, where an emetic is forced into his stomach.
The police spot the word Cessna on each of the keys. One officer recalls that Cessna is the name of a popular two-engine plane.
This is the first inkling the police have that the defendant owns or
flies an airplane. The police demand to know where the plane is
located and whether it contains any drugs.
Frightened by, and still shaken from, the "stomach pumping"
and the rough tactics employed by the police earlier in his bedroom,
the defendant reveals the location of the plane and admits that it
contains a large quantity of drugs. On the basis of this information,
the police obtain a warrant, search the plane, and find the drugs. 90
Are the drugs admissible in evidence against the defendant?
I think it fairly clear that the Court would not admit the drugs
obtained under the foregoing circumstances. 91 I find it hard to be-

88. 342 U.S. at 173 (quoting Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936)).
89. 342 U.S. at 173.
90. Cf. United States v. Downing, 665 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1981); see also infra note 97
(discussing Downing).
91. I am assuming that the prosecution could not establish that the evidence derived from
the keys and questioning about the keys fell within one of the recognized exceptions to the
poisonous tree doctrine - for example, that the airplane and its contents would inevitably
have been discovered even if the police had not violated the defendant's rights.
In United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980), the Court referred to the "three commonly advanced exceptions" to the poisonous tree doctrine - where the government has
learned of the derivative evidence from an "independent source," where the evidence would
"inevitably" have been discovered lawfully, and where the connection between the police
violation and the derivative evidence has become so "attenuated" as to dissipate the taint.
445 U.S. at 470. See generally 1 LAFAvE & IsRAEL, supra note 43, § 9.3 (c)-(e), at 736-42;
Pitler, supra note *. For application of the inevitable discovery exception, see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 330-54.
In my two hypothetical variations on Rochin (for the second hypothetical, see infra text
accompanying notes 93-97), I do not think it can be said that the connection between the
derivative evidence and the police misconduct has become so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint.
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lieve that a court that would exclude the evidence on the facts of
Rochin would admit the derivative evidence on the facts of the
hypothetical.
In the hypothetical case, no less than in the Rochin case itself,
the conviction was brought about "by methods that offend 'a sense
of justice.'" In the hypothetical case, no less than in Rochin, to
admit the physical evidence would be to "sanction" the brutal conduct or afford it "the cloak of law." In the hypothetical case, no less
than in Rochin, to admit the evidence found in the defendant's airplane would be to encourage the police to act the same way - or at
least not discourage them from doing so - the next time the occasion arose "on the chance that all will end well." 92
Now, let us change the facts of Rochin one more time. Consider
the following:
The police lawfully arrest the defendant and take him down to
headquarters for questioning. The police inform the defendant that
they have reason to believe that he is in possession of a large quantity of drugs - which is true - and they demand to know where he
is keeping the drugs. The defendant denies any involvement in the
drug trade. When he persists in his denial, a police officer puts a
pistol to his head and threatens to pull the trigger unless he reveals
the hiding place of the drugs. 93 Or the police strip off the defendant's clothes and keep him naked for several hours. 94 Or, aware
that the defendant's wife is confined to a wheelchair, the police
threaten to bring her down to the stationhouse for questioning unless he "cooperates." 95 Or relays of officers question the defendant
96
for many hours without affording him an opportunity for sleep.
At this point, the defendant confesses that he is a drug dealer
and that he has stored a large quantity of drugs in his Cessna airplane. He also reveals the location of the plane. On the basis of
this information, the police obtain a warrant, search the plane, and
find the drugs. 97 Are the drugs admissible in evidence against the

defendant?
92. In Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1940), Judge (later Chief
Justice) Vinson observed, "Officers should not be encouraged to proceed in an irregular

manner on the chance that all will end well." 115 F.2d at 694. Nueslein excluded a voluntary
incriminating statement because the officers were in a position to hear the defendant's remark only because they had entered his home illegally.
93. Cf.Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967).
94. Cf.Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
95. Cf.Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
96. Cf.Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
97. Consider United States v. Downing, 665 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1981). After he was taken
into custody and advised of his Mirandarights, the defendant explicitly stated that he wished
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How, if at all, is the second hypothetical case different from the
first? In both hypotheticals, to admit the evidence would be to
"sanction" police methods that "offend 'a sense of justice'" and to
afford these methods "the cloak of law."
In the first hypothetical, constitutionally obnoxious police methods forced the defendant to vomit up the keys that led the government to his plane and to the incriminating evidence. In the second
hypothetical, constitutionally obnoxious police methods forced the
defendant to make the confession that, in effect, provided the government with "the keys" to his plane. Why shouldn't the evidentiary consequences that flow from the violation in the second
hypothetical be the same as those that flow from the violation in the
first?
In the first hypothetical, the police forcibly extracted the "direct" or "primary" evidence from the suspect's stomach, whereas in
the second hypothetical, it might be said, they forcibly extracted it
from the suspect's mind.98 Why should there be a constitutional
distinction? Why should the "secondary" or "derivative" evidence
be excluded in one case but not the other?
One might say that pumping a suspect's stomach is more shocking than putting a gun to a suspect's head to get him to confess or
to see a lawyer before talking further. This request was disregarded. The drug enforcement
agents then instructed the defendant to empty his pockets and surrender various articles,
including some keys. When asked what the keys were for, the defendant told the agents that
they belonged to his Cessna airplane. When asked by the police where the plane was located,
defendant told them where it was parked. This was the first time any of the drug enforcement agents learned of the plane's existence.
On the basis of this information, law enforcement agents obtained a warrant and searched
the plane. The search uncovered charts and other documents. The officers then questioned
airport employees, who made certain statements implicating defendant in a drug conspiracy.
In an opinion by Chief Judge Coffin, joined by Judge (now Supreme Court Justice)
Breyer and Judge Bonsal, the court held that unless the evidence would have been obtained
independently of the defendant's statements to the agents - and the court of appeals remanded the case to the district court to determine this issue - the tangible and testimonial
evidence gathered by searching the plane and questioning airport employees should be excluded, as well as the defendant's statements about the existence and location of his airplane:
"[I]n order to deter the impermissible police conduct here we must exclude the evidentiary
fruits of appellee's statements as well as the statements themselves." 665 F.2d at 409.
The government relied heavily on Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), see supratext
accompanying notes 65-67, but the court distinguished Tucker in part on the ground that that
case was "rooted in the distinction between a violation of the Fifth Amendment and a violation of 'the prophylactic rules developed to protect that right.'" 665 F.2d at 408 (quoting
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 439). In the instant case, on the other hand, defendant had "asserted his
Fifth Amendment right [to have counsel present at any interrogation] and the federal official
violated that right by continuing interrogation." 665 F.2d at 408.
98. Cf.Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) ("It would be a stultification of the
responsibility which the course of constitutional history has cast upon this Court to hold that
in order to convict a man the police cannot extract by force what is in his mind but can
extract what is in his stomach.").
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threatening to bring a suspect's ailing wife to the police station to
get him to "cooperate." How so is not at all clear to me. But why
bother to dwell on the point? In each instance the police violated a
right protected by the Due Process Clause - a right "basic to a
free society" and "therefore implicit 'in the concept of ordered liberty.' "99 That is about as bad a thing as can be said of police conduct. Surely we are not going to say that when the police coerce a
suspect into confessing they violate rights "basic to a free society,"
but when they pump a suspect's stomach they violate rights "very
basic to a free society."' 00
One might retort that not all coerced confessions involve brutality or physical violence. That is true. As the Court pointed out
thirty-five years ago, "coercion can be mental as well as physical,
and.., the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark"' 01 of a
coerced confession. But what follows from this?
It is troubling enough, as Justice Stevens has noted, that the
Court has attempted to distinguish between actual coercion and irrebuttably presumed coercion (Mirandaviolations). 1°2 Are we now
going to attempt to fashion a distinction between mildly coerced
confessions and blatantly coerced ones? A coerced confession is a
coerced confession is a coerced confession. Regrettably, a majority
of the present Court has drawn a distinct line between what it calls
"mere Miranda violations" and coerced confessions (or actual infringements of the Fifth Amendment itself). 03 But all coerced confessions are constitutionally obnoxious, and all are violations of due
process.
A final point about Rochin. To use that case as a basis for discussion of coerced confessions and the applicability of the poisonous tree doctrine to such confessions strikes me as only fitting and
proper, because in excluding the evidence produced by the stomach
pumping, the Court relied very heavily on the analogy to coerced
confessions. Of course, if - as Amar and Lettow still maintain
some forty years later - the reason for excluding coerced confes99. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). Justice Frankfurter, writing in Wolf, drew
upon Justice Cardozo's famous language in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).

100. At the very least, there is, as Professor Francis Allen once observed, "a certain inelegance in speaking of rights 'very basic to a free society' or in indulging in what appears to be
almost a comparison of superlatives." Francis A. Allen, Federalism and the FourthAmendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 9 (footnote omitted); see also Kamisar,
supra note 27, at 1123-24.
101. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960).
102. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 368 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. See infra text accompanying notes 180-87, 195-210.
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sions is their unreliability, the Rochin Court's analogy to coerced
confessions would have been badly flawed. After all, what could be
more trustworthy than the evidence found in a person's stomach?
It is worth recalling how the Rochin Court dealt with this point:
It has long since ceased to be true that due process of law is heedless of the means by which otherwise relevant and credible evidence is
obtained. This was not true even before the series of recent cases
enforced the constitutional principle that the States may not base convictions upon confessions, however much verified, obtained by coercion. These decisions . . . are only instances of the general
requirement that States in their prosecutions respect certain decencies
of civilized conduct. Due process of law... [means] that convictions
cannot be brought about by methods that offend "a sense of

justice ......
To attempt in this case to distinguish between what lawyers call
"real evidence" from verbal evidence is to ignore the reasons for excluding coerced confessions. Use of involuntary verbal confessions in
State criminal trials is constitutionally obnoxious not only because of
their unreliability. They are inadmissible under the Due Process
Clause even though statements contained in them may be independently established as true. Coerced confessions offend the community's sense of fair play and decency. 0 4
I.

CHALLENGING AMAR AND LETrow's CLAIM THAT CURRENT
DocrRiNEs AND TRENDs SUPPORT THEIR APPROACH

TO THE FurrT

AmENDmENT

Amar and Lettow recognize that their approach to the Fifth
Amendment "may at first glance seem like a startling break from
current interpretations."' 0 5 They maintain, however, that their approach becomes much more plausible when viewed in light of various "current doctrines or trends. 106 In this regard, they rely
heavily on Schmerber v. California,0 7 which, they tell us, "emphasize[d] the distinction between testimony and physical evidence"108
and "gave rise to a sweeping assertion of the need to let in reliable
physical evidence."' 0 9 They also contend that the Court is "now
chipping away at use plus use-fruits immunity in the context of Mirandawarnings"110 and that such immunity "should be brought into
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

342 U.S. at 172-73.
Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 927.
Id. at 927-28.
384 U.S. 757 (1966).
Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 919.
Id. at 885.
i&at 880.
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line with Justice O'Connor's suggested approach in Quarles for
'mere' Miranda violations.""' Finally, they rely heavily on the
writings of one of the greatest judges of our time, Henry Friendly,
who urged the admissibility of physical evidence derived from Miranda violations. In the pages ahead, I shall argue that neither
Amar and Lettow's reliance on Schmerber, nor their reliance on
Justice O'Connor's views, nor iheir reliance on Judge Friendly's
writings is well founded.
A.

Does Schmerber Support Amar and Lettow?

In urging the admissibility of physical evidence derived from
compelled statements, Amar and Lettow place considerable reliance on Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Schmerber v.
California.112 I have great difficulty seeing why.
In Schmerber, the Court held that requiring a motorist suspected of drunken driving to submit to the withdrawal of blood for
chemical analysis did not violate the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. "The distinction which has emerged," observed
Justice Brennan, "is that the privilege is a bar against compelling
'communications' or 'testimony,' but that compulsion which makes
a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence' does
13
not violate it.""1
In the instant case, he emphasized, the withdrawal of blood did not implicate the defendant's "testimonial
capacities."114
As I read the Schmerber opinion, it holds - unremarkably" 5 that the withdrawal of blood, and more generally the acquisition of
111. Id. at 911.
112. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
113. 384 U.S. at 764.
114. 384 U.S. at 765.
115. As a leading commentator on evidence observed twelve years before the Schmerber
case was decided, according to the prevailing view - one "expounded by Wigmore and
widely accepted in recent opinions" - the privilege furnishes protection only against "testimonial compulsion." McComutcK, supranote 26, at 264. In those jurisdictions that followed
the prevailing view, continued Professor McCormick, "the accused without breach of this
privilege may be... physically examined, may have his blood'and other bodily fluids taken
for tests without his consent, may be required to give a specimen of his handwriting... and
may be forced to participate in a police 'line up.'" Id. at 264-65 (emphasis added).
Under a second, and minority, view of the privilege, observed McCormick, "the line is
drawn between enforced passivity on the part of the accused and enforced activity on his
part." Id. at 265. But even under this view, "the prisoner could, for example, be required to
submit to finger-printing and the extraction of blood." Id. (emphasis added).
Finally, under a third and distinctly minority view, "any evidence secured by compulsion
from the prisoner, whether by requiring him to act or by his mere passive submission, is
within the privilege." Id. at 266. But, added McCormick, "Presumably no court today would
carry out such a notion consistently, as to do so would prevent such established practices as
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nontestimonial evidence, standingalone - that is, untainted by any
antecedent Fifth Amendment violation - does not offend the privilege against self-incrimination. That's all it holds.
The Schrnerber Court did not write on a clean slate. It reaffirmed the approach taken in a 1910 Supreme Court case, Holt v.
United States.116 In Holt, the Court was taken aback by the contention that compelling a person to put on a blouse to determine
whether it fit him violated the privilege. It dismissed the argument
as "based upon an extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment.' 17 The privilege against self-incrimination, explained Justice
Holmes, "is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not8 an exclusion of his
body as evidence when it may be material."s
1. The Limited Scope of Schmerber
Amar and Lettow highlight the distinction Schmerber and Holt
drew between physical evidence and testimonial evidence in order
to bolster their argument that only the defendant's compelled utterances - but not their fruits - should be protected by the Fifth
Amendment, and thus only his compelled utterances, not their
fruits, should be excluded from a criminal case. They tell us, almost
breathlessly, that Schmerber "gave rise to a sweeping assertion of
the need to let in reliable physical evidence, via a definition of witness that drew a sharp distinction between words and physical evidence." 119 They maintain that Schmerber provides support for their
view that only a person's compelled utterances - a coerced confession or testimony obtained in exchange for a grant of immunity should be excluded, not physical evidence derived from such utter20
ances as well.'
At one point, Amar and Lettow call Schmerber "an absolutely
central case today - the rock on which a great many cases and121a
considerable amount of crime detection policy have been built."'
One might say that it is also one of the rocks on which the AmarLettow argument is built.
compulsory finger-printing and requiring the accused at the trial to stand up for identification." Id.
116. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
117. 218 U.S. at 252.
118. 218 U.S. at 252-53.
119. Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 885.
120. See id at 919.
121. Id. at 892-93.
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This may surprise Amar and Lettow, but I have no quarrel with
Schmerber or Holt. Moreover, and I suspect that this will surprise
Amar and Lettow even more, I do not think that Schmerber or Holt
support their position - because those cases have nothing to say
about the use of physical evidence derived from compelled testimony or coerced confessions.
Schmerber tells us that the privilege does not protect directly
against nontestimonial compulsion. That's all. It has nothing to say
about whether the acquisition of blood tests or other physical evidence obtained as a result of compelled utterances should be excluded in order to put a curb on the indirect use of Fifth
Amendment violations. 1'
Neither in Schmerber nor in Holt did the police violate a constitutional guarantee at any point along the way. Neither in Schmerber nor in Holt was the defendant compelled to disclose
information that might lead to damaging physical evidence. Thus
there was no need to determine whether any physical evidence was
tainted by a priorconstitutional violation. There was no derivative
evidence or "fruit of the poisonous tree" to be considered, because
there was no "poisonous tree."
We would do well to read Justice Brennan's opinion in Schmerber to mean exactly what he said:
Petitioner'stestimonial capacities were in no way implicated; indeed,
his participation, except as a donor, was irrelevant to the results of the
test, which depend on chemical analysis and on that alone. Since the
blood test evidence ...

was neither petitioner's testimony nor evi-

dence relatingto some communicative act or writing by the petitioner,
it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds. 123
A quarter-century later, writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Brennan -

the author of the Schmerber opinion -

looked

back on Schmerber as a case in which compelling a suspect to provide a blood sample "was outside of the Fifth Amendment's protec122. In Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), the case that first used the phrase
fruit of the poisonous tree 308 U.S. at 341, the Court observed that "[t]o forbid the direct use
of methods [in
this instance, illegal wiretapping] ...but to put no curb on their full indirect
use would only invite the very methods deemed 'inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty.'" 308 U.S. at 340.
123. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also Doe v.
United States, 487 U.S. 201, 211 n.10 (1988) ("[The Schmerber] Court distinguished between
the suspect's being compelled himself to serve as evidence and the suspect's being compelled
to disclose or communicate information or facts that might serve as or lead to incriminating
evidence."); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 350 n.32 (1985) (Brennan, J.,dissenting)
("Schmerber had nothing to do with the derivative-evidence rule, but held only that the evidence compelled in the first instance in that case - blood samples - was nontestimonial in
nature.").
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tion, not simply because the evidence concerned the suspect's
physical body, but rather because the evidence was obtained in a
manner that did not entail any testimonial act on the part of the
suspect."124
Suppose the Chief of Police informs a murder suspect that he
will turn him over to a lynch mob unless he reveals where he hid the
clothes he wore at the time of the crime,125 and the suspect then
reveals the hiding place of his or his victim's blood-stained blouse.
Or suppose that after being subjected to a lengthy interrogation
while he is physically incapacitated in an intensive care unit, a seriously wounded suspect finally tells the police where he hid his or his
victim's blood-stained blouse. 126 In the hypotheticals I have posed,
can the government compel the suspect to model his blouse? Can
the government analyze the blood found on the victim's blouse, establish that it matches the defendant's blood, and offer these findings in evidence? These questions strike me as very different than
the ones presented in Schmerber and Holt.
If Holmes were still on the Court and the defendant contended
in either of the hypothetical cases that the blood-stained blouse or
the blood test results should be excluded because they had been
obtained by "exploitation" of a coerced confession, 2 7 1very much
doubt he would dismiss that argument as based on an extravagant
extension of the Fifth Amendment. After all, it was Holmes who
remarked, a decade after Holt, that "[t]he essence of a provision
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not
merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but
that it shall not be used at all."''
To be sure, Justice Holmes made that remark, for a majority of
the Court, in a search and seizure case. But why is his reasoning
any less applicable to a Fifth Amendment case? Are the fruits of a
coerced confession any less stained with illegality than the fruits of
a Fourth Amendment violation?
As Justice Brennan said for the Court sixty years after Holmes
spoke about the essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence, "the exclusionary sanction applies to any 'fruits' of a constitutional violation - whether such evidence be... physical [evi124. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 593 (1990).
125. Cf Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
126. Cf.Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
127. Cf.Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
128. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). This case is
considered the genesis of the poisonous tree doctrine, as it later came to be called.

HeinOnline -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 958 1994-1995

March 1995]

The Fruits of Compelled and Coerced Statements

959

dence or] ... items observed or words overheard."' 12 9 And if, as

Professors LaFave and Israel have put it, the coerced confession
doctrine is, inter alia, intended to deter improper police conduct "in
much the same way as the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule for
physical evidence,"' 130 why should the Court not apply the poisonous tree doctrine to coerced confessions as it has done in search and
seizure cases?
Moreover, the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits a person from
being compelled to be a witness against himself, has its own exclusionary rule, which, in turn, has its own "built-in" poisonous tree
doctrine. 131 What else did Counselman mean when it told us long before the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine acquired its
colorful name, and long before it emerged in the search and seizure
context - that the Fifth Amendment protects a person "from being
compelled to disclose the circumstances of his offence [or] the
sources from which, or the means by which, evidence of its commission, or of his connection with it, may be obtained... without using
132
his answers as direct admissions against him?"'
Amar and Lettow tell us that "[w]itnesses testify" but "blood
does not" and that "we do not usually conceive of blood as 'knowing' anything."' 33 This is a valid point when we deal with constitutionally uncontaminated blood test evidence, but whether blood
"knows" or "speaks" is beside the point, I submit, when we talk
about blood test evidence that owes its discovery to, and is tainted
by, a prior violation of the Fifth Amendment.
As the foregoing hypotheticals illustrate, when we talk about
the fruits of a Fifth Amendment violation, we are talking about
cases where a person - if not his blood - did know something and
where a person - if not his blood - was forced to tell what he

knew. The prosecution would not have been able to offer a blood
sample in evidence in these cases if the defendant had not been
forced to incriminate himself.
When we talk about admitting physical evidence derived from
compelled testimony or coerced confessions, we are talking about
129. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980) (footnote omitted); see also Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441 (1984) (noting that the "fruits" doctrine applies to other incriminating evidence derived from the illegally obtained evidence).
130. 1 LAFAvE & IsRAEL, supra note 43, at 443.

131. See infra text accompanying notes 275-79.
132. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892) (quoting Emery's Case, 107
Mass. 172, 182 (1871)). This view of the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination has
been reaffirmed many times. See infra text accompanying notes 257-61.
133. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 889.

HeinOnline -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 959 1994-1995

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 93:929

fact situations - unlike Holt or Schmerber - where (i) compulsion
was used to extort communications from a defendant;134 (ii) the evidence did relate to some communicative act by the defendant; 135
(iii) the defendant was forced "to reveal, directly or indirectly, his
knowledge of facts relating him to the offense"; 136 or (iv) the defendant was "compelled to disclose or communicate information or
facts that might serve as or lead to incriminating evidence. 1 37
2. The Need To Consider the Entire Chain of Events
In determining whether certain evidence is admissible we should
not, as do Amar and Lettow, dwell on the nature of the evidence in
the abstract or focus exclusively on the last step of a multistep
course of action by the police. We should consider, instead, the entire course of police conduct from beginning to end. Indeed, such a
consideration is what the principles of the Fifth Amendment
demand.
It does not matter whether, looking only at the last phase of the
police conduct, Evidence B was, or appears to have been, lawfully
obtained if, taking into account the entire chain of events, Evidence
B was the end-product of unconstitutional police conduct - if, for
example, information as to the location of Evidence B was "compelled" within the meaning of the privilege. If this is the situation
then the question is no longer whether Evidence B would be beyond the reach of a particular constitutional guarantee if its acquisition were viewed in a vacuum - no longer, for example, whether
nontestimonial evidence would be admissible if its attainment were
sealed off from prior acts of testimonial compulsion. The question
instead is whether Evidence B was fatally tainted by a prior
violation.
The first case that comes to mind is Welsh v. Wisconsin.1 38 Admission into evidence of one's refusal to take a breathalyzer test or one's refusal to provide blood or urine samples for the purpose
of determining the presence or quantity of alcohol - does not of134. Cf.Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910).
135. Cf.Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966).
136. Cf Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 213 (1988) ("[The policies of the privilege]
are served when the privilege is asserted to spare the accused from having to reveal, directly
or indirectly, his knowledge of facts relating him to the offense ....).
137. Cf.487 U.S. at 211 n.10 ("[The Schmerber] Court distinguished between the suspect's being compelled himself to serve as evidence and the suspect's being compelled to
disclose or communicate information or facts that might serve as or lead to incriminating
evidence.").

138. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
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fend the Fifth Amendment. 139 Nevertheless, the Welsh Court overturned the revocation of a defendant's driver's license for refusing
to take a breath-analysis test because before the defendant was
taken to the police station where he refused to submit to the test, he
had been unlawfully arrested in his own home. 140 The opinion of
the Court was written by Justice Brennan - and it was a long one.
But the author of Schmerber saw no need to discuss that case.
There wasn't any need. Schmerber was not relevant.
Welsh is hardly unique. There are many other cases illustrating
the same point.
If the procedure is viewed in isolation, an on-the-spot chemical
test of white powder that would reveal only whether the substance
was cocaine is beyond the reach of the Fourth Amendment because
it is not a "search," 141 just as, standing alone, the withdrawal and
chemical analysis of blood is beyond the reach of the Fifth Amendment because it does not constitute testimonial compulsion. But if
drug agents come upon a package unlawfully - attain dominion
and control over it by means of an unreasonable search and seizure
the results of a chemical test of the package's contents might
well be barred by the Fourth Amendment. 142 .Similarly, although
the use of a narcotics-detecting dog is not a "search" or "seizure" in
and of itself, a search based on the alert of a drug detecting dog
may nevertheless run afoul of the Fourth Amendment if illegally
obtained knowledge formed the impetus for the use of the detector
dog.143
As a general proposition, the Fourth Amendment does not offer
any protection to a person who voluntarily consents to a search.
But it may furnish protection if the consent search is the fruit of
prior police misconduct - if, for example, an otherwise valid con139. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
140. See 466 U.S. at 754. The parties agreed that if a person were unlawfully arrested, his
refusal to take a breath test would be reasonable and therefore could not be grounds for the

revocation of a driver's license. See 466 U.S. at 744.
141. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
142. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117. In Jacobsen, the results of the chemical test of a trace
amount of white powder were held admissible because the initial invasions of the package
containing the powder were occasioned by the acts of a private freight carrier. After opening
the package pursuant to a written company policy regarding insurance claims and after noticing a white powdery substance, originally concealed under many layers of wrappings, employees of the freight carrier notified the Drug Enforcement Administration of their
discovery. Under the circumstances, "the federal agents did not infringe any constitutionally
protected privacy interest that had not already been frustrated as the result of private conduct." 466 U.S. at 126.
143. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEancs AND SEizuR: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 11.4(f), at 423 (2d ed. 1987).
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sent is preceded by, and tainted by, an illegal arrest. 144 Insuch a
situation the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine "extends to invalidate consents which are voluntary."'1 45
Ordinarily, objects stuffed in a garbage can are beyond the protection of the Fourth Amendment, just as ordinarily nontestimonial
evidence is beyond the protection of the Fifth. But a different constitutional result obtains if the police enter a person's home illegally
and the homeowner rushes out the door, followed closely by the
police, and tries to hide the incriminating evidence in a nearby garbage can. Under such circumstances, the evidence removed from
the trash receptacle is excluded on the ground that its seizure was
"a direct consequence" of a lawless entry into a private dwelling. 146
In Olmstead v. United States,'47 in the course of holding, over
the famous dissents of Holmes and Brandeis, that the wiretapping
that occurred in that case did not violate the Fourth Amendment,
the Court emphasized that conversations were not things:
The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material
things - the person, the house, his papers or his effects. The description of the warrant necessary to make the proceeding lawful, is that it
must specify the place to be searched and the person or things to be
seized.
...

The Amendment does not forbid what was done here. There

was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured
by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. 148
Although some years later a federal statute was enacted prohibiting the use of wiretapping by law enforcement officials as well as
private citizens, 149 Olmstead governed the law of nontelephonic
144. See 3 id. § 8.2(d).
145. Id. at 190. In such instances, some courts say that the consent was not voluntary, but
as Professor LaFave emphasizes, "the evidence obtained by the purported consent should be
held admissible only if it is determined that the consent was both voluntary and not an exploitation of the prior illegality." Id.
146. See Work v. United States, 243 F.2d 660, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The court did call
attention to the fact that the trash receptacle was under the stone porch of the house, not
beyond the curtilage, but I think the main reasoning of the court - and standard application
of the poisonous tree doctrine - would have led to the same result even if the trash receptacle had been at the curb in front of the defendant's house.
147. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
148. 277 U.S. at 464. But as was to become most significant later, in Olmstead no violation of the Fourth Amendment had preceded the use of the sense of hearing.
149. See Pub. L. No. 416,48 Stat. 1064,1103-04 (repealed by Crime Control Act of 1968);
see also KAmisAR, LAFAvE & IsRAE, supranote 19, at 363-65 (discussing statute and citing
authorities); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S.
321 (1939).
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electronic surveillance for the next four decades. 150 Nevertheless,
during that time the Court made plain that the Fourth Amendment
did furnish some protection against the seizure of oral statements
if the police who listened were able to do so only because they
had committed a priorviolation of the Fourth Amendment.
In Silverman v. United States,'5 1 the police utilized a so-called
spike mike to listen to what was going on within the defendant's
house. The police pushed this device through the party wall of an
adjoining house until it touched the heating ducts in defendant's
home, converting the entire heating system into a conductor of
sound. 152

Troubled by language in Olmstead and other cases to the effect
that the Fourth Amendment protects against the acquisition of
things, not conversations, Silverman urged the Court to reexamine
the rationale of these decisions. But the Court saw no need to do
so:

[T]he circumstances here [do not] make necessary a re-examination
of the Court's previous decisions in this area. For a fair reading of the
record in this case shows that the eavesdropping was accomplished by
means of an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by [the defendant]....
Eavesdropping accomplished by means of such a physical intrusion is beyond the pale of even those decisions in which [the] Court
has held that eavesdropping accomplished by other electronic 53means
did not amount to an invasion of Fourth Amendment rights.
Two years later, still during the reign of Olmstead, the Court
demonstrated once again that despite the Olmstead view that the
Fourth Amendment does not directly prohibit the use of evidence
secured by the sense of hearing, the Fourth Amendment does play a
role if the oral statements were the fruits of an independent violation of the amendment. In the famous Wong Sun case, 54 the Court
threw out a defendant's voluntary statements because they were the
products of a prior unreasonable search and seizure:
150. Olmstead was finally overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In
Katz, Justice Stewart, uttering the famous line "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places," wrote for the Court that "the reach of [the Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon
the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." 389 U.S. at 351,
353.
151. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
152. 365 U.S. at 506-07.
153. 365 U.S. at 509-10.
154. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); see also infra text accompanying
notes 305-17 (discussing Wong Sun).
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The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical,
tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an
unlawful invasion. It follows from our holding in Silverman that the
Fourth Amendment may protect against the overhearing of verbal
statements as well as against the more traditional seizure of "papers
and effects." Similarly, testimony as to matters observed during an
unlawful invasion has been excluded to enforce the basic constitutional policies. Thus, verbal evidence which derives so immediately
from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized arrest as the officers'
action in the present case is no less the "fruit" of official illegality than
the more common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion.1 55
It bears repeating that although the Court decided Silverman
and Wong Sun at a time when the prevailing view was that the
Fourth Amendment only protected against the acquisition of material things, that way of thinking about the amendment did not matter when the entire chain of events called for the exclusion of oral
statements. Such statements were still excluded if they were the
fruits of a Fourth Amendment violation.
Amar and Lettow dwell on the fact that reliable physical evidence - for example, a bloody knife or the defendant's own blood
is not "testimonial." But that should not matter if the totality of
the circumstances calls for the exclusion of the physical evidence
because it was derived from and fatally tainted by a prior Fifth
Amendment violation.
The fact that the evidence ultimately "found" or "seized" in
Silverman and Wong Sun was neither a "paper" nor an "effect" did
not insulate it from the impact of a prior violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Similarly, the fact that evidence ultimately acquired is
not "testimonial" should not insulate it from the effects of a prior
Fifth Amendment violation.
3. ProtectionAgainst "Use and Derivative Use"
Given their understanding of the Fifth Amendment's animating
principles, Amar and Lettow maintain that the Amendment requires only a relatively narrow kind of immunity. I believe they are
mistaken both about what the Fifth Amendment stands for and
about what kind of immunity it requires.
Nothing in the Schmerber opinion suggests that the withdrawal
and chemical analysis of blood - or, more generally, the acquisition of nontestimonial evidence - has a special immunity that protects it against a constitutional challenge stemming from an
antecedent Fifth Amendment violation. Nothing in the opinion
155. 371 U.S. at 485 (citations omitted).
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suggests that if a coerced confession led the police to a blood156
stained garment - "furnish[ed] a link in the chain of evidence"'
the blood analysis would still be admissible because blood does
not "speak." Indeed, if, on the day after the case had been decided,
anyone had claimed that Schmerber did have that implication, I
think the Justices who composed the majority - especially Justice
Brennan, who wrote the opinion of the Court - would have been
157
astounded. After all, only two years earlier in Malloy v. Hogan,
the Court, again speaking through Justice Brennan, had upheld the
invocation of the privilege by a defendant who refused to answer
questions relating to the identity of a certain individual because
"disclosure of [the individual's] name might furnish a link in a chain
of evidence sufficient to connect [the defendant] with a more recent
crime for which he might still be prosecuted."' 58
Moreover, the same day the Court handed down its opinion in
Malloy, it decided another important Fifth Amendment case, Murphy v. Waterfront Commission. 59 I think Murphy, too, makes evident why Schmerber should be read narrowly - why it cannot
plausibly be read as insulatingthe taking of a blood sample or the
acquisition of any other physical evidence from the effects of an
antecedent Fifth Amendment violation.
Although Murphy held that a grant of immunity in one jurisdiction is binding on other jurisdictions as well, it also held that at least
in situations in which the prosecuting jurisdiction differs from
the one that granted the immunity, the privilege against selfincrimination requires use and derivative use immunity.1 60 Until
Murphy, it was generally assumed that an individual could not be
compelled to testify unless she was given transactional immunity,
under which the government was prohibited from prosecuting a
person for any transaction or offense about which she had
testified.161
156. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479,486 (1951), quoted with approvalin Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964).
157. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Malloy held that the privilege against self-incrimination applied
to the state via the Fourteenth Amendment and that under the applicable federal standard,
the state court had erred in ruling that the privilege was not properly invoked. 378 U.S. at 3.
158. 378 U.S. at 13 (footnote omitted).
159. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
160. See, e.g., 378 U.S. at 79 ("[A] state witness may not be compelled to give testimony
which may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits
cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution
against him." (emphasis added)).
161. See, eg., EnwAR J. IMWInKaEUED Er AL, COURTROOM CRIMIA. EVIDENCE
§ 1733 (1993); 1 LAFAvE & IsR-Am, supra note 43, § 8.11(b), at 685-90; CHA. s H. WmrmFBREAD & CrusroRmER SLonoorN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15.04(b)(1) (3d ed. 1993);
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But no member of the Murphy Court suggested that the Fifth
Amendment permitted anything less than use and derivative use
immunity; no Justice challenged the view first set forth in Counselman v. Hitchcock' 62 that, as Justice White described it, "the coverage of the privilege extend[s] to not only a confession of the
offense but also disclosures leading to discovery of incriminating
63
evidence. 1
As Amar and Lettow point out,164 in a concurring opinion Justice White, joined by Justice Stewart, underscored the need for a
narrower standard of protection than transactional immunity in all
situations, 65 not just in interjurisdictional settings - a viewpoint
that has since prevailed. 166 But the concurring Justices made plain
their agreement with the majority that the Fifth Amendment required nothing less than protection against use and derivative use of
compelled testimony. 67
One of the arguments Justice White made for limiting the scope
of immunity is worth flagging. In maintaining that the privilege requires no more than protection against the use and derivative use of
compelled testimony, White drew an analogy to coerced confessions. He likened the plight of an individual who had given testimony in exchange for immunity to that of a defendant who had had
a confession extracted from him by lawless police. 168
Why not make such a comparison? After all, "[a] coerced confession is as revealing of leads as testimony given in exchange for
immunity and indeed is excluded in part because it is compelled
incrimination in violation of the privilege."'1 69
Justice White assumed that the poisonous tree doctrine applies
to coerced confessions as well as to unreasonable searches and
Note, Standardsfor Exclusion in Immunity Cases after Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82 YALE L.J.
171 (1972).
162. 142 U.S. 547 (1892). Counselman is discussed in considerable detail infra in text
accompanying notes 237-61.

163. 378 U.S. at 105 (White, J.,
concurring).
164. Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 877.
165. 378 U.S. at 106-07 (White, J.,
concurring).
166. "Following Murphy, Congress adopted a new immunity provision for federal witnesses, replacing transactional immunity with a prohibition against use and derivative use as
to both federal and state prosecutions." 1 LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supranote 43, at 686. The new

federal provision was upheld in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), which quoted
portions of Justice White's concurring opinion in Murphy with approval. Kastigar is dis-

cussed in considerable detail infra in text accompanying notes 268-79.
167. See 378 U.S. at 92-93, 101-03, 106 (White, J., concurring).
168. See 378 U.S. at 102-03 (White, J., concurring).
169. 378 U.S. at 103 (White, J., concurring).
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seizures. 170 Even so, the victim of a coerced confession does not
receive transactional immunity. As Justice White assumed, he may
keep out evidence derived from and tainted by the confession, but
not evidence that "had an independent, legitimate source."'171 Why,
asked Justice White, should a person who gives testimony in exchange for immunity be in a better position? Why should such an
individual - but not the person whose constitutional rights were
violated by police interrogators - be entitled to "absolute immu172
nity from prosecution?"'
Justice White's argument, in short, was that so long as the government does not make use of compelled testimony or its fruits in a
criminal prosecution, the Fifth Amendment ought to be satisfied just as it is when the government uses neither a coerced confession
nor its fruits in a criminal prosecution. 173
I realize that Amar and Lettow are unhappy with use and derivative use immunity - what they and some other commentators call
"use plus use-fruits immunity" - and that they believe only compelled testimony should be excluded from a criminal prosecution,
not the fruits of such testimony as well. 174 But in reflecting on
whether the Schmerber Court would have reached a different result
had an independent Fifth Amendment violation preceded and
170. I say that Justice White assumed this because although he evidently thought it obvious that the fruits of a coerced confession would have to be excluded, as well as the confession itself - unless the government came within a recognized exception to the poisonous
tree doctrine - as Amar and Lettow note, there seems to be no Supreme Court case precisely on point. See supra note 52.
171. 378 U.S. at 103 (White, J., concurring).
172. 378 U.S. at 102 (White, J., concurring).
173. When the Court adopted Justice White's views on the appropriate scope of immunity eight years later in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), it also relied on an
analogy to coerced confessions, and it also assumed that the fruits of a confession had to be
excluded along with the confession itself. In Kastigar the Court observed:
A coerced confession, as revealing of leads as testimony given in exchange for immunity,
is inadmissible in a criminal trial, but it does not bar prosecution. Moreover, a defendant against whom incriminating evidence has been obtained through a grant of immunity
may be in a stronger position at trial than a defendant who asserts a Fifth Amendment
coerced-confession claim. One raising a claim under this statute need only show that he
testified under a grant of immunity in order to shift to the government the heavy burden
of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent sources. On the other hand, a defendant raising a coerced-confession claim
under the Fifth Amendment must first prevail in a voluntariness hearing before his confession and evidence derived from it become inadmissible.
406 U.S. at 461-62 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
For an elaboration of the point that either the general poisonous tree doctrine itself or
Counselman and its view that the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule has what might be
called a "built-in" poisonous tree doctrine was the basis for the federal immunity statute at
issue in Kastigar as well as for the Court's view that a ban on the use and derivative use of
compelled testimony was necessary and sufficient to satisfy the Fifth Amendment, see infra
text accompanying notes 275-79.
174. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 858, 880, 911.
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tainted the taking of the blood sample - and more generally, in
considering how narrowly or broadly the case may plausibly be read
I hope I may be allowed to take into account relevant and related cases on the books at the time, even though Amar and Lettow
wish those cases did not exist.
B. Does Justice O'Connor - or the Court Amar and Lettow?

Support

In New York v Quarles,175 the police caught up with a rape suspect in the rear of a supermarket. Having heard from the victim
that the person who raped her was carrying a gun, the police asked
the cornered suspect where the gun was. He nodded in the direction of some empty cartons and responded, "The gun is over there."
The officer reached into one of the cartons and retrieved a loaded
revolver. 176
Although the police had failed to give the defendant the Miranda warnings, a majority of the Court ruled that his statement
was admissible under a "public safety" exception to Miranda.177 In
her concurrence, Justice O'Connor disagreed. She would have excluded the defendant's statement but not the gun itself - because
"nothing in Miranda or the privilege itself requires exclusion of
nontestimonial evidence derived from informal custodial
interrogation."'1 78
Amar and Lettow contend that Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion furnishes support for their view that physical evidence derived from coerced confessions or compelled testimony should be
admissible. 79 I think not.
The snippets of Justice O'Connor's opinion quoted by Amar
and Lettow do seem to support their thesis, but when her opinion is
read in its entirety, it is clear that O'Connor is urging a special rule
for the fruits of Miranda violations. 80 Again and again, she em175. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).

176. 467 U.S. at 652.
177. 467 U.S. at 655.
178. 467 U.S. at 660 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
179. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 881-82, 911, 928.
180. When Justice O'Connor speaks of "nontestimonial evidence derived from informal
custodial interrogation," 467 U.S. at 660, it is clear, at least when one reads her opinion in its
entirety, that she means evidence derived from an interrogation that violates the Miranda
rule, but not the coerced confession rule. See 467 U.S. at 661 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("The MirandaCourt for the first time made the Self-Incrimination Clause applicable to responses induced by informal custodial police interrogation,
thereby requiring suppression of many admissions that, under traditional due process principles, would have been admissible." (emphasis added)); see also 467 U.S. at 668 (O'Connor, J.,
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phasizes that the defendant was not "subject[ed] to abusive police
practices"' 181 or "actually or overtly coerced"'18 and that the gun
"derived not from actual compulsion but from a statement taken in
the absence of Mirandawarnings."'183
Justice Marshall, who dissented in Quarles, directed most of his
fire at Justice Rehnquist for adopting a public safety exception to
Miranda, but he did aim one passage at concurring Justice
O'Connor. If the defendant's statement was inadmissible (and he
contended it was), then, maintained Marshall, so was the gun - for
it was the "direct product" of the improper question. 84 At this
point Justice Marshall referred to two of the most famous Fourth
Amendment poisonous tree cases - Silverthorne Lumber 85 and
Wong Sun. 186 If Justice O'Connor had shared Amar and Lettow's
view, the quickest and most obvious way to respond to Marshall
would have been (i) to assert that neither the Fifth Amendment nor
the coerced confession rule requires the suppression of derivative
physical evidence, or (ii) to maintain that the poisonous tree doctrine only applies to Fourth Amendment violations. But Justice
O'Connor did neither. Instead, she retorted, "Wong Sun and its
'fruit of the poisonous tree' analysis leads to exclusion of derivative
evidence only where the underlying police misconduct infringes a
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("To be sure, admission of nontestimonial evidence
secured through informal custodial interrogation will reduce the incentives to enforce the
Miranda code." (emphasis added)).
181. 467 U.S. at 672 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182. 467 U.S. at 670 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
183. 467 U.S. at 671 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added). The United States, which filed an amicus brief in the Quarles case supporting the
State of New York, conceded that a gun or other nontestimonial evidence derived from a
compelled statement - rather than a violation of Miranda's"prophylactic rules" - should
be excluded:
Counselman involved a statement compelled by the threat of punishment for contempt,
but we would agree that nontestimonial evidence derived from a statement that has been
compelled by police interrogation practices that overbear the will of a suspect should
also not be admitted into evidence.
* [In this case, the] gun is nontestimonial evidence derived not from a statement
shown to be compelled but from a statement obtained (we assume arguendo) in violation of the prophylactic rules of Miranda- rules that preclude the use of many statements that are not themselves in fact compelled. When nontestimonial evidence is
directly linked to compelled statements, it is plausible to say that the values underlying
the Self-Incrimination Clause would be offended by the use of nontestimonial evidence
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 27, Quarles (No. 821213) (citations omitted).
184. 467 U.S. at 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
185. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
186. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Wong Sun is discussed infra in text
accompanying notes 305-17.
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'core' constitutional fight. Failure to administer Miranda warnings
violates only a nonconstitutional prophylactic."' 8 7
I must say I disagree with Justice O'Connor's view of Miranda.
I would not denigrate that rule, as I believe she does. But one may
reject someone's reasoning and still understand it. I think I understand Justice O'Connor.
Admittedly, it will not always be easy to apply her test; it will
not always be clear what is or is not "a 'core' constitutional fight."
But this much is plain: A failure to administer the Mirandawarnings does not violate a core constitutional right. (According to a
majority of the present Court, it does not seem to violate a constitutional fight at all.) But a coerced confession does violate a core
constitutional right. If not, it would be hard to imagine what police
conduct would.
I am sure that Justice O'Connor would be quick to agree that a
coerced confession constitutes an infringement of a core constitutional right. As she wrote for the Court only a year after she concurred in Quarles, police interrogation techniques that produce
involuntary or coerced confessions "are so offensive to a civilized
system of justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 88
Evidently, Amar and Lettow believe that emanations from Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Quarles support their view
that physical evidence derived from compelled testimony and coerced confessions should be admissible. I think not. I think Justice
O'Connor took considerable pains to cut off just such emanations:
[W]hen the Miranda violation consists of a deliberate and flagrant
abuse of the accused's constitutional rights, amounting to a denial of
due process, application of a broader exclusionary rule is warranted.

Of course, "a defendant raising [such] a coerced-confession claim ...
must first prevail in a voluntariness hearing before his confession and
evidence derived from it [will] become inadmissible."' 189
Even if the distinction Justice O'Connor drew in Quarles between mere Miranda violations and coerced confessions had been
less forceful, I would still maintain that her opinion does not provide support for the Amar-Lettow thesis. In ascertaining the meaning and scope of an opinion, one should read it - unless there are
187. 467 U.S. at 671 n.4 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation
omitted).
188. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985).
189. 467 U.S. at 672 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,462 (1972)) (emphasis added); see also supranote 173
(discussing Kastigar); infra text accompanying notes 268-79 (same).
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as "limited by the neighbor-

hood of principles ... which become strong enough to hold their
own when a certain point is reached." 190 Reading Justice
O'Connor's opinion as "pointing the way"'191 for the admissibility of
the fruits of compelled testimony or coerced confessions would run
smack into the well-established rule that the Fifth Amendment requires protection against use and derivative use.19
As noted earlier, I am well aware that Amar and Lettow would
like to overrule Kastigarand other cases standing for this rule. But
the more relevant question is whether Justice O'Connor would like
to do so. So far as I am aware, there is no evidence that she would.
I cannot resist noting that in the passage from Quarles set forth
above, Justice O'Connor quotes from the Kastigar opinion with apparent approval. Moreover, she quotes from the portion of the
opinion that likens compelled testimony, which requires protection
against use and derivative use, to a coerced confession. 93
As Justice O'Connor observed, in the main the Court "has refused to extend the [Miranda]decision or to increase its strictures
on law enforcement agencies in almost any way."' 94 In keeping
with that general attitude, she would not extend Miranda or increase its strictures on the police by suppressing physical evidence
derived from statements obtained in violation of that rule; she
would only exclude the statements themselves. On the other hand,
when police interrogation methods do produce a coerced confession, when police misconduct does amount to a denial of due process, then, to use Justice O'Connor's words, "application of a
broader exclusionary rule is warranted."' 95
The key to Justice O'Connor's Quarles opinion, I submit, is not
the Amar-Lettow thesis that the reliable fruits of a Fifth Amendment violation should always be admissible. Rather, it is that - as
hard as it is for some of us to accept - a "mere" Mirandaviolation,
190. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (Holmes, J.).
191. Amar & Lettow, supranote 1, at 928 ("Justice O'Connor has pointed the way [to the
Amar-Lettow view that the physical fruits of compelled testimony and coerced confessions
should be admissible] in Quarles, where she suggested always allowing fruits in for mere
Miranda violations."); see also id. at 881-82, 911.
192. See infra text accompanying notes 237-79.
193. For the full setting in which this quotation appears, see infra text accompanying note
284.
194. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 663 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The one exception is the Edwardsrule, which is triggered when a custodial suspect asserts his
right to counsel. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S.
675 (1988); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
195. 467 U.S. at 672 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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unlike a coerced confession or compelled testimony, does not constitute a violation of the Fifth Amendment itself.
This becomes even clearer when one examines the second opinion Justice O'Connor wrote on the general subject. In Oregon v.
Elstad,196 this time speaking for the Court, Justice O'Connor underscored the lowly position Miranda currently occupies in the hierarchy of rights. She described a defendant whose Mirandarights have
been violated as one "who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm."' 97 And she characterized a breach of the Miranda
rule as an occurrence that involves "no actual compulsion" and "no
actual infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights."19
In Elstad, the fruits of the Mirandaviolation were incriminating
statements made by the defendant during a second meeting with the
police, at which time, unlike in his first session, the defendant's Miranda rights were honored. The Court held that the fact that the
police had obtained a statement from the defendant in violation of
his Miranda rights when they questioned him earlier at his home
did not bar the admissibility of the second statement, made at the
station house, when, this time, the police had complied with
Miranda.199
196. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
197. 470 U.S. at 307.

198. 470 U.S. at 308.
199. Elstad may be read very narrowly or quite broadly.
The narrow reading: The record is bereft of any factual support for the conclusion that
the defendant's incriminating statement at his first meeting with the police caused him to
confess, after he was fully advised of his rights and waived them, at the second meeting.
Moreover, the confession made at the second meeting was not the product of intentional
exploitation of the prior improper conduct by the police. There is no evidence that the police
took advantage of the prior illegality in any way, for example, by confronting the defendant
with, or reminding him of, his earlier statement. If, for example, the police had told the
defendant that because he had admitted his presence at the scene of the burglary when he
was first questioned, he might as well give them a full account of his involvement in the crime
now that he was being questioned again, the result might have been different. Finally, the
failure to advise the defendant of his Miranda rights at the first meeting was arguably inadvertent or only a borderline Miranda violation. If, for example, the defendant had asserted
his right to counsel at the first meeting and the police had refused to honor that right, the
result might have been different. Such a violation of Miranda might have been viewed as
deliberate police misconduct calculated or likely to undermine the defendant's powers of
resistance. At one point Justice O'Connor distinguished cases such as Elstad,where the police failed to advise a suspect of his Mirandarights at their first meeting, from cases "concerning suspects whose invocation of their rights to remain silent and to have counsel present
were flatly ignored while police subjected them to continued interrogation." 470 U.S. at 313
n.3.
Thus, there is some support in the majority opinion for dissenting Justice Stevens's view
that "the Court intends its holding to apply only to a narrow category of cases in which the
initial questioning of the suspect was made in a totally uncoercive setting and in which the
first confession obviously had no influence on the second." 470 U.S. at 364 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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Justice O'Connor's opinion in Elstad is much more elaborate
and more carefully and clearly written than her earlier concurring
opinion in Quarles. Moreover, because her Elstad opinion is the
opinion of the Court, not just the viewpoint of a single justice, the
Elstad opinion is more important.
Because Amar and Lettow maintain that Justice O'Connor's approach to the fruits of Miranda violations supports their view that
the fruits of compelled testimony and coerced confessions should
be admitted as well 200 - and I read her comments very differently
I feel the need to quote from Justice O'Connor's Elstad opinion
at considerable length and let the reader decide for herself:
Even if Elstad applies to all Mirandaviolations that fall short of actual coercion, the case
may not apply to all types of derivative evidence. Elstad does not deal specifically with the
admissibility of physical or nontestimonial evidence derived from a Miranda violation; the
Court has never explicitly addressed that issue. See Massachusetts v. White, 439 U.S. 280
(1978), affg. by an equally divided Court Commonwealth v. White, 371 N.E.2d 777 (Mass.
1977) (holding that physical evidence obtained from a Mirandaviolation must be excluded).
See also Patterson v. United States, 485 U.S. 922 (1988), where Justice White, joined by
Justice Brennan in dissenting from the denial of certiorari, observed that Elstad "did not
squarely address the question [whether physical evidence derived from a Mirandaviolation is
admissible] ... and in fact, left the matter open." 485 U.S. at 923 (White, J., dissenting).
Dissenting in Elstad, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, maintained that
"[n]otwithstanding the sweep of the Court's language, [the majority] opinion surely ought not
be read as also foreclosing application of the traditional derivative-evidence presumption to
physical evidence obtained as a proximate result of a Miranda violation," noting that the
majority "relies heavily on individual 'volition' as an insulating factor in successive-confession cases" - a factor "altogether missing in the context of inanimate evidence." 470 U.S. at
347 n.29 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also noted that "most courts considering
the issue have recognized that physical evidence proximately derived from a Mirandaviolation is presumptively inadmissible." 470 U.S. at 347 n.29 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to David A. Wollin, however, "[f]ollowing Elstad, federal and state courts have almost
uniformly ruled that the prosecution can introduce nontestimonial fruits of a Mirandaviolation in a criminal trial. The poisonous tree doctrine will be applicable only if there is evidence of actual coercion or other circumstances designed to overbear the suspect's will."
Wollin, supra note *, at 835-36 (footnotes omitted).
The broadreading: At several places in her opinion for the Court, Justice O'Connor tells
us that the poisonous tree doctrine assumes the existence of an underlying constitutional
violation - for example, a violation of the Fourth Amendment or "police infringement of
the Fifth Amendment itself." 470 U.S. at 309; see also 470 U.S. at 304-05, 308. Because it is
plain that, according to a majority of the Court, a Miranda violation does not qualify as a
"constitutional violation," one may conclude that the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply
to Mirandaviolations at all - whether the fruit is a second confession or the testimony of a
government witness or physical evidence. Moreover, at one point Justice O'Connor writes as
if the Court had already decided that the tangible fruits of a Mirandaviolation are admissible. Thus, after discussing Michigan v. Tcker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), which upheld the admissibility of the testimony of a government witness who was discovered as a result of a Miranda
violation because, inter alia, the third-party witness's testimony did not violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights, she adds: "We believe that [the reasoning of Tucker] applies
with equal force when the alleged 'fruit' of a noncoercive Miranda violation is neither a
witness nor an article of evidence but [as in the instant case] the accused's own voluntary
testimony." 470 U.S. at 308 (emphasis added).
For purposes of this essay, I shall assume that the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply
to noncoercive Mirandaviolations at all.
200. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 881-82, 911, 928.
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[The defendant's] contention that his confession was tainted by
the earlier failure of the police to provide Mirandawarnings and must
be excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree" assumes the existence of a
constitutionalviolation....
... As in [the instant] case, the breach of the Mirandaprocedures
in Tucker involved no actual compulsion.... Since there was no actual
infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights, the [Tucker] case
was not controlled by the doctrine expressed in Wong Sun that fruits
of a constitutional violation must be suppressed.
...If errors are made by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic Miranda procedures, they should not breed the
same irremediable consequences as police infringement of the Fifth
Amendment itself It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold
that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by
any actual coercion.., so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period. 201
As I read her two opinions on the admissibility of the fruits of a
Mirandaviolation, Justice O'Connor drew the same distinct line between "mere" Mirandaviolations and actual "infringements of the
Fifth Amendment itself" that the Court had drawn earlier in the socalled impeachment cases. In that setting too, the Court painted a
bright line between Mirandaviolations, which may be used to impeach a defendant who testifies in his own defense,2 02 and a coerced
confession or compelled testimony, which cannot be used for im203
peachment purposes.
Although Harrisv. New York 204 held that statements obtained
in violation of Miranda may be used to impeach a defendant who
takes the stand in his own defense, the Court declared peremptorily
in Mincey v. Arizona2 05 that "any criminal trial use against a de-

201. 470 U.S. at 305, 308 (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor refers to Michigan v.
fIcker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), a case that dealt with the admissibility of the testimony of a
witness whose identity had been learned by questioning the defendant without giving him full
Mirandawarnings. In holding that the witness's testimony was admissible, the Court viewed
the Miranda warnings as "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution" but only
"prophylactic standards" designed to "safeguard" or to "provide practical reinforcement for
the right against compulsory self-incrimination." 417 U.S. at 444-46. Tucker is discussed
supra in note 66.
202. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
203. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (coerced confession); New Jersey V.
Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979) (compelled testimony).
204. 401 U.S. 222 (1971); see also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (presenting a
variation of the factual situation in Harris). For powerful criticism of Harris,see Dershowitz
& Ely, supra note 74.
205. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
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fendant of his involuntary statement is a denial of due process of
law. ' 206 When, a year later in New Jersey v. Portash,207 the prosecution contended that immunized grand jury testimony could be used
for impeachment purposes, the Court retorted in effect that Mincey
had already resolved that issue against the government:
As we reaffirmed last Term, a defendant's compelled statements, as
opposed to statements taken in violation of Miranda,may not be put
to any testimonial use whatever against him in a criminal trial....
Testimony given in response to a grant of legislative immunity is
the essence of coerced testimony .... The information given in re-

sponse to a grant of immunity may well be more reliable than information beaten from a helpless defendant, but it is no less compelled.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide a privilege against
compelled self-incrimination, not merely against unreliable selfincrimination. Balancing of interests was thought to be necessary in
[the Mirandaimpeachment cases] when the attempt to deter unlawful
police conduct collided with the need to prevent perjury. Here, by
contrast, we deal with the constitutional privilege against compulsory
therefore, is
self-incrimination in its most pristine form. 20Balancing,
8
not simply unnecessary. It is impermissible.
In Portash, the defendant had received use and derivative use
immunity - what the Court called "the necessary constitutional
scope of testimonial immunity. '20 9 It is hard to believe that the victim of a coerced confession is entitled to any less protection. Testimony in response to an immunity grant may be no less compelled
than a confession extracted from a helpless defendant, but surely it
is no more compelled. If testimony in exchange for immunity implicates the privilege "in its most pristine form," so does a coerced
confession. If compelled testimony is "the essence of coerced testimony," so is a coerced confession.
In relying on the Miranda impeachment cases, the Portash
Court pointed out, "the State has overlooked a crucial distinction
between those cases and this one":210 the defendants in those cases
had made no claim that their statements were coerced or involuntary. Amar and Lettow overlook the same crucial distinction, I submit, when they look upon the statements Justice O'Connor made in
the special context of Miranda as support for their general thesis.
206. 437 U.S. at 398; see also 437 U.S. at 402 ("Due process of law requires that statements obtained as these were cannot be used in any way against a defendant at his trial.").
207. 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
208. 440 U.S. at 459.
209. 440 U.S. at 458 (emphasis added).
210. 440 U.S. at 458.
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Does Judge Friendly Support Amar and Lettow?

Because Judge Henry Friendly, probably the most formidable
critic of Miranda,2 11 may have been the first commentator to argue
that the fruits of Miranda violations should be admitted into evidence, and because both Justice O'Connor 2 12 and Amar and Lettow213 quote him with approval, a close look at what Friendly had
to say about the fruits of inadmissible confessions seems warranted.
First of all, Judge Friendly recognized that his proposal to admit
the fruits of Miranda violations posed substantial dangers: "The
more serious question is how far admission of fruits would perpetuate the police abuses at which the Miranda opinion was partly
aimed; the police, it can be forcefully argued, would invariably exercise the option to sacrifice the statements themselves rather than
follow the frustrating Miranda code. '214 Friendly had reason to be
concerned. As he noted, "It has been said that 'what data there
are' suggest that the obtaining of leads with which to obtain real or
demonstrative evidence or prosecution witnesses is more important
to law enforcement than getting statements for use in court. '215
Amar and Lettow cite Judge Friendly for the proposition that
"physical leads are often more important to law enforcement than
getting statements for use in court, ' 21 6 but they do so in a way that
would lead many a reader to believe that Friendly considered this
an argument for admitting physical leads into evidence. I think it
fairly clear, however, that he viewed this as an argument for not
doing so. He concluded nevertheless that the fruits of a Miranda
violation should be admissible, evidently because he thought the
211. See generally FRIENDLY, supra note 25.
212. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649,668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
213. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 889.
214. FRIENDLY, supra note 25, at 282. A year later, when he delivered the Robert S.
Marx Lectures at the College of Law at the University of Cincinnati, Judge Friendly reiterated this concern:
Yet it can be argued against [the proposal to admit the fruits of Mirandaviolations] that
anything short of extending the Miranda code to fruits and leads will fail to end the

"third degree." Faced with the alternatives of obeying the code, with its dampening
effect on the giving of answers, and using coercive methods in the hope of obtaining

unusable answers that will yield usable fruits, the police, it will be asserted, will invariably opt for the latter.
Friendly, supra note 10, at 712 (footnote omitted).

215. Id. at 712 n.176; see also Wollin, supra note *, at 845 (pointing out that "[e]xpert
interrogators have long recognized, and continue to instruct, that a confession is a primary
source for determining the existence and whereabouts of the fruits of a crime, such as documents or weapons") (footnote omitted). In a footnote, Wollin quotes from or refers to various interrogation manuals. See id. at 845 n.202.
216. Amar & Lettow, supranote 1, at 922 n.286.
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need to use such fruits outweighed the risk that their admissibility
2 17
would have an adverse effect on police behavior.
I have read and reread Judge Friendly's arguments for admitting
the fruits of Miranda violations. I am able to follow most of his
arguments, but not, I confess, all of them. It may be my shortcoming, but I find one argument - one quoted by Justice O'Connor
and by Amar and Lettow as well 218 especially puzzling:
"[A]Ithough a suspect's answers are indeed 'testimonial' insofar as
they implicate him and would be banned as such, their use merely
to find other evidence establishing his connection with the crime
differs only by a shade from the permitted use for that purpose of
219
his body or his blood."
Judge Friendly cites two cases in support of this statement:
Schmerber v. California,220 which I have already discussed at con-

siderable length,22 1 and Holt v. United States,222 a 1910 case.223 In
Holt, the question arose whether a blouse belonged to the defendant, and the Court upheld the admissibility of a witness's testimony
that the defendant put on the blouse and it fit him.2 24 I fail to see
the relevance of either case to the issue we are debating. In neither
case was the disputed evidence the fruit of a constitutional violation. In neither case did the defendant's answers lead the government to the disputed evidence.
Although some have argued to the contrary, I am perfectly willing to concede that physical evidence differs only by a shade from
the "permitteduse" of a person's body or his blood. But that only
leads to other questions: Under what circumstances should the use
of a person's body or his blood be permitted? Should the use of a
person's blood, or physical evidence generally, be permitted regardless of the police misconduct that led to its acquisition? Clearly not,
I believe. As I have argued at length, it should be permitted and, I believe, it is permitted - only when, as in Schmerber and
Holt, the physical evidence was not derived from and tainted by an
217. See infra text accompanying notes 230-36.
218. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 671 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 887.
219. FRIENDLY, supra note 25, at 280 (footnote omitted).
220. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
221. See supra section II.A.

222. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
223. See FRIENDLY, supra note 25, at 280 n.67.
224. 218 U.S. at 252-53. For further discussion of Holi see supra text accompanying

notes 116-18.

HeinOnline -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 977 1994-1995

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 93:929

antecedent Fifth Amendment violation or other constitutional
violation.
The statement by Judge Friendly quoted above should be read
in light of everything he had to say about the admissibility of the
fruits of confessions. When so read, all he meant, I am convinced,
is that although a suspect's answers to questions asked by police officers who fail to administerthe Mirandawarnings are "indeed testimonial," the use of answers to such questions to find other evidence
of crime should still be permitted. To give his statement a more
expansive reading than that would conflict with what Judge
Friendly had to say a year later in his Marx Lectures:
[T]he involuntary confession rule reflected a belief that there was an
area where government might legitimately inquire before the criminal
process began; only when its agents overpassed the boundaries of decent conduct [Le., obtained a coerced confession] did the answers and
theirfruits have to be excluded.
One solution to [the problems posed by Miranda]would be to go
along with the majority's holding that answers obtained in violation of
the Mirandarules may not be used but to admit the fruits
25 where the
questioning had not violated basic concepts of decency.2
In any event, when Friendly actually formulated his proposal, he
was quite guarded. He called for "an intermediate rule whereby
although [the state] cannot require the suspect to speak by punishment or force, the non-testimonial fruits of speech that is excludable only for failure to comply with the Miranda code could still be
used." 226
This formulation, too, is not free from doubt. I maintain that
Judge Friendly's proposal drew a line between situations in which
the police failed to administer the Miranda warnings and those instances in which the police "require[d] the suspect to speak by punishment or force." 227 I contend that he was not calling for a
revision of the rule (or what he assumed to be the rule) governing
coerced confessions - a rule he thought required the fruits of such
225. Friendly, supra note 10, at 709, 712 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Thus,
although there appears to be no Supreme Court case precisely on point, see supra note 52,
Judge Friendly assumed that the poisonous tree doctrine applied to coerced confessions and
barred the used of physical evidence derived from such confessions. The Court assumed the
same thing in Kastigar. See infra text accompanying note 284. So did Justices White and
Stewart, concurring in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 103 (1964). See supra
text accompanying notes 170-72. So did Justice Blackmun, concurring in Pillsbury Co. v.
Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 278 (1983). See infra notes 283, 286.
226. FRmNDLY, supra note 25, at 280 (emphasis added).
227. Id.
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confessions as well as the confessions themselves to be excluded22 8
but only proposing that an exception to the general rule be
carved out for "mere" Miranda violations, that is, for confessions
inadmissible "only for failure to comply with the Mirandacode." 229
But no doubt others would read Friendly's proposal differently.
They would argue, for example, that the "logic" of his proposals or
the "emanations" from his reasoning applied to the fruits of coerced confessions as well as to the fruits of Mirandaviolations.
On the basis of this passage alone, we would not know for sure
what Judge Friendly meant. But we do know for sure - because he
told us. TWo pages later - in a statement that, astonishingly, Amar
and Lettow completely ignore - he wound up his discussion of the
admissibility of a confession's fruits as follows: "Certainly any rule
allowing the admission of fruits would have to be limited, as was the
Johnson ruling with respect to retroactive application, to interrogation not violating due process standards; fruits of confessions obtained by physical brutality or other abhorrent means should clearly
'230
be excluded.
A flat, emphatic statement trumps all implications and emanations to the contrary. And it is hard to see how Friendly could have
been any clearer or more emphatic.
If, as Amar and Lettow stress, the physical fruits of confessions
"are quite reliable and often highly probative pieces of evidence," 231 why did Judge Friendly, for whom they evidently have a
high regard,232 balk at admitting the physical fruits of coerced
confessions?
One can't be sure. Perhaps Judge Friendly did not believe that
he had the same room to maneuver when it came to coerced confessions as he did when he dealt with "mere" Miranda violations.233
(We know he assumed that the poisonous tree doctrine applied to
228. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
229. FR1ENnLY, supra note 25, at 280.

230. FRIENDLY, supra note 25, at 282. The reference is to Johnson v. New Jersey, 384
U.S. 719 (1966), which held that Miranda only applied to cases in which the trial began after
the date of that decision.
231. Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 895; see also id.at 922-23.
232. See id.at 901 (referring to Judge Friendly's "wise and influential lectures on the
Self-Incrimination Clause"). Perhaps I should add that I share Amar and Lettow's high
regard for Judge Friendly. I served with him - and some thirty others - on the Advisory
Committee to the American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure project for nine eventful years and came away with the impression that he was the wisest adviser
of all.
233. Recall that when the Court held in New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979), that
coerced or compelled utterances - as opposed to statements obtained in violation of Miranda- could not be used for impeachment purposes, it remarked that when dealing with a
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the fruits of coerced confessions. 234) Perhaps he believed that the
Fifth Amendment protected against the use and derivative use of a
confession compelled by the police no less than it did testimony
compelled by a grant of immunity. But even if he believed he were
free to compose and propose on a clean slate, I believe Judge
Friendly would have arrived at the same conclusion he did with respect to the fruits of a coerced confession.
He drew a sharp line - as I think the Court did in Elstad between "mere" Miranda violations and confessions that Justice
O'Connor later identified as "offensive to a civilized system of justice." 235 I think he was determined to condemn in the strongest
way possible police interrogation methods that "violate[ ] basic concepts of decency."'236 I also believe he feared that if the prosecution
were allowed to use the often-valuable leads produced by coerced
confessions, the police would have a significant incentive to resort
to unacceptable interrogation techniques.
To put it another way, I think that even if Judge Friendly believed he was free to weigh the costs and benefits of preventing the
use of evidence derived from coerced confessions - and perhaps
he did feel free to do so - he would have concluded - and perhaps he did conclude - that the need to disapprove and to discourage interrogation methods that violate minimum standards of due
process outweighed the costs of exclusion.

m[I.

COUNSELMAN V. HzTcHcocK, KASTIGAR v. UvNITED

STATES, AND THE POISONOUS TREE DoCTRINE

Counselman v. Hitchcock237 marked the first time the Supreme
Court considered a challenge to an immunity statute. 238 When
questioned by a grand jury about possible criminal violations of the
Interstate Commerce Act, Counselman invoked the privilege
against self-incrimination. Although he was granted testimonial immunity - protection only against the use of the specific testimony
Fifth Amendment violation "in its most pristine form," the balancing of competing interests
"is impermissible." 440 U.S. at 459.
234. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
235. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985). As Justice O'Connor observed for the
majority in Miller, the Court "has long held that certain interrogation techniques... are so
offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 474 U.S. at 109.
236. Friendly, supra note 10, at 712.
237. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
238. See Hal M. Koontz & Jeffrey C. Stodel, Note, The Scope of Testimonial Immunity
Under the Fifth Amendment, 6 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 350, 361 (1973).
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compelled from him - Counselman persisted in his refusal to answer. As a consequence, he was adjudged in contempt of court. On
appeal, the Supreme Court upheld Counselman's refusal to answer,
pointing out that the statute furnishing immunity failed to protect
him against the derivative use of his testimony. This was a fatal deficiency that the Court repeatedly emphasized:
[The statute] could not, and would not, prevent the use of his testimony to search out other testimony to be used in evidence against
him or his property, in a criminal proceeding .... It could not prevent the obtaining and the use of witnesses and evidence which
should be attributable directly to the testimony he might give under
compulsion, and on which he might be convicted, when otherwise,
and if he had refused to answer, he could not possibly have been
convicted.
...

[The statute] does not supply a complete protection from all

the perils against which the constitutional prohibition [against compulsory self-incrimination] was designed to guard, and is not a full
substitute for that prohibition ....

[The statute] affords no protection

against that use of compelled testimony which consists in gaining
therefrom a knowledge of the details of a crime, and of sources of
information which may supply other means of convicting the witness
or party.P 9

The Counselman Court was well aware that a number of the
state constitutional counterparts to the Fifth Amendment prohibited a person from being compelled to "give evidence" or to "furnish evidence" against himself and thus contained more expansive
language than the Fifth Amendment itself.240 But the Court believed that the state and U.S. constitutional provisions, "however
differently worded, should have as far as possible the same
interpretation." 241
What should that interpretation be? It should include, the
Court told us - quoting from Emery's Case,242 a Massachusetts
case - protecting a person" 'from being compelled to disclose...
the sources from which, or the means by which, evidence of [his
crime] ... or of his connection with it, may be obtained... without

using his answers as direct admissions against him.' ,,243

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

142 U.S. at 564, 585-86.
See 142 U.S. at 584.
142 U.S. at 585.
107 Mass. 172 (1871).
142 U.S. at 585 (quoting Emery's Case, 107 Mass. at 182).
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In Counselman, the appellee argued - as do Amar and Lettow24 4 - that Emery's Case is easily distinguishable because it involved the construction of a state provision declaring that "[n]o
subject shall be... compelled to accuse or furnish evidence against
himself." 245 But the Court did not think the difference in wording
was important: "[H]owever this difference [in the wording of the
Massachusetts and similar state provisions] may have been commented on in some of the [state] decisions, there is really, in spirit
and principle, no distinction arising out of such difference of
46
language. '2
Once it held that the Fifth Amendment furnished protection
against the derivative use of one's compelled testimony, the Counselman Court could have ended its opinion. It sufficed that (i) at
the very least, the Fifth Amendment required protection against the
use and derivative use of compelled utterances, and (ii) the challenged immunity statute failed to satisfy even this minimal standard. There was no need to say any more.
But the Counselman court did say more. At the very end of a
long opinion, it added a statement - one that a later Court called
"dictum" 247 - that "a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford
absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offence to
which the question relates." 4
Why the Counselman Court felt the need to add this statement
is unclear. Perhaps it thought that use and derivative use immunity,
as a practical matter, could not furnish a person sufficient protection against such subtle uses of compelled testimony as the identification of witnesses. 249 Or perhaps the Court was not "aware of the
244. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 915-16.
245. 142 U.S. at 557-58, 586.
246. 142 U.S. at 586.
247. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 454-55 (1972). After stating that the
"broad language in Counselman [about the need for a valid statute to provide 'absolute immunity'] ... was unnecessary to the Court's decision, and cannot be considered binding
authority," the Court noted that "[l]anguage similar to the Counselman dictum can be found
in" two other cases. 406 U.S. at 454-55 & n.39.
Consider also Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964):
The [Counselman] Court established for the first time that the coverage of the privilege
extended to not only a confession of the offense but also disclosures leading to discovery
of incriminating evidence, a matter of considerable doubt at the time.... In a dictum
indicating that some immunity statutes are valid, the Court added that "a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity...
378 U.S. at 105-06 (White, J., concurring).
248. 142 U.S. at 586.
249. This was the argument that petitioners made unsuccessfully in Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 459-62 (1972), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 268-79.
Although use and derivative use immunity was upheld in Kastigar,various organizations,
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middleground afforded by use and derivative use immunity, but
rather conceived of transactional immunity as the only alternative
to use immunity." 250
In any event, I share the view that "the essence of Counselman"
is its determination that the privilege protects against the derivative
use, as well as the use, of compelled utterances: 251 it prevents the
government from using compelled testimony to gain "knowledge of
...sources

of information which may supply other means of con-

victing" 252 a defendant. At the very least, this portion of the opinion is, as the Court later called it, "the conceptual basis of
3
Counselman."25
I find it odd that Amar and Lettow never refer to this portion of
Counselman - a portion that constitutes the bulk of the opinion. I
have no desire to get entangled in a discussion of "holding" versus
"dictum." I am willing to avoid the term "dictum" and say that (i)
the "primary," or perhaps even the "intermediate," holding of
Counselman was the determination that the immunity statute at issue had to fall because it failed to provide protection against the
derivative use of compelled testimony, and (ii) the "secondary," or
perhaps even the "ultimate," holding was the view that an immunity
statute must provide "absolute immunity," or what has come to be
known as "transactional immunity." But why do Amar and Lettow
never allude to what may be called the primary holding - or at
least the intermediate holding - of the case? Why is Counselman

"including the American Bar Association and the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
[have] urged retention of transactional immunity, and a majority of states continue to provide the broader immunity." I LAFAvE & IsRAr., supra note 43, § 8.11(b), at 687-88 (foot-

note omitted). For a useful summary of the debate between the proponents of the two types
of immunity, see 1 id. § 8.11(b), at 688-90.
250. Koontz & Stodel, supra note 238, at 361 n.78. The state courts were split between
those upholding the constitutionality of testimonial immunity statutes and those requiring
immunity statutes to provide complete immunity from prosecution for the crimes disclosed
by the compelled testimony. See id. After noting this division in the state courts, the Counselman Court explicitly chose to follow the state cases requiring complete, or transactional,
immunity. See id.
251. See Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Comment on Immunity Provisions,in 2 WORKING PAPERS
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 1405, 1430-31
(1970) ("[T]he essence of Counselman is its use restriction language, and not the additional
loose statement from which the absolute immunity has been derived. It would seem, therefore, that the traditionally broader language used in Federal immunity statutes, which raises a
question concerning the use of independent evidence, is unneeded."). For the significance of
Professor Dixon's comprehensive immunity study, see infra text accompanying note 280.
252. 142 U.S. at 586.
253. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
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described only as a case that "established an extraordinarily sweeping form of immunity" 254 and as an "1892 chestnut"? 255
According to the dictionaries I have consulted, one of the secondary definitions of chestnut, and the one I assume Amar and Lettow
had in mind, is "an old and stale joke. ' '256 The Counselman case
may be old, but its primary or intermediate holding is hardly stale.
In the hundred years since Counselman was decided, the Court has
never deviated from the view that the minimal form of immunity
required by the Fifth Amendment is protection against the use and
derivative use of compelled testimony.
Again and again, the Court has told us that the privilege "not
only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction.., but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in
the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant..."-;257 that
"a state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may
be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony
and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in
connection with a criminal prosecution against him"; 258 that the
privilege protects a witness compelled to testify against any governmental "use of the compelled testimony or its fruits in connection
with a criminal prosecution against the person testifying"; 259 that "a
witness protected by the privilege may rightfully refuse to answer
unless and until he is protected at least against the use of his compelled answers and evidence derived therefrom in any subsequent
criminal case in which he is a defendant";260 and that the "policies
[of the privilege] are served when the privilege is asserted to spare
254. Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 875-76. Compare the description of the same case
in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956):
[In Counselman, a unanimous Court had found [an immunity statute] constitutionally
inadequate ... because the immunity granted was incomplete, inthat it merely forbade
the use of the testimony given and failed to protect a witness from future prosecution
based on knowledge and sources of information obtained from the compelled testimony.
350 U.S. at 436-37 (citation omitted); see also Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 274
concurring) ("In Counselman v. Hitchcock this Court held that [a stat.
(1983) (Blackmun, J.,
ute only providing testimonial immunity] could not be used to compel a witness to testify
against himself, because it did not provide protection coextensive with the Fifth Amendment." (citation omitted)).
255. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 858.
256. See Tim AmERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (2d college ed. 1985) (an old and stale
joke); THE RANDOM HousE COLLEGE DICTIONARY (rev. ed. 1975, 1988) (an old or stale
joke); WEBsTER's UNABRIDGED DIMCONARY OF 'nm ENGLISH LANGUAOGE (1989) (an old or
stale joke); cf CHAMBERS ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1988) (a stale joke or clich6).
257. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (Clark, J.).
258. Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964) (Goldberg, J.)(citing
Counsetman).
259. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968) (Fortas, J.) (citing Counselman).
260. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973) (White, J.).
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his knowlthe accused from having to reveal, directly or indirectly,
261
edge of facts relating him to the offense ....-

Whether regarded as a holding or as dictum, the broad language
at the end of the Counselman opinion "was taken as indicating that
a valid immunity grant must absolutely bar prosecution for any
transaction noted in the witness' testimony. '262 Accordingly, the
"transactional immunity statute became the basic form for the numerous federal immunity statutes until 1970."263
However, language in a 1964 case, Murphy v. Waterfront Corn-

mission,264 indicated that use and derivative use immunity would be
constitutionally sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the
privilege. 265 Thus encouraged, Congress began considering a new
type of immunity statute. Finally, it enacted section 6002 of the
Crime Control Act of 1970,26 which replaced transactional immunity with a prohibition against use and derivative use. The new immunity statute provided:
[N]o testimony or other information compelled under the [court] order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any
criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.267
In Kastigar v. United States,268 a 5-2 majority upheld the new

federal provision against the contention that use and derivative use
immunity did not adequately protect a witness and thus was insufficient to supplant the privilege. The Court held that because the
challenged provision "prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from
261. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 213 (1988) (Blackmun, J.).
262. 1 LAFAVE & IsRAEr, supra note 43, § 8.11(b), at 685.
263. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 452 (1972) (footnote omitted).
264. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
265. See 378 U.S. at 79. There is language to the same effect in Gardner v. Broderick, 392
U.S. 273,276 (1968). See also People v. La Bello, 249 N.E.2d 412,414 (N.Y. 1969) (viewing
Counselman as not barring use and derivative use immunity).
The House report accompanying the immunity statute upheld in Kastigar specifically
states that the statute "is designed to reflect the use-restriction immunity concept of Murphy
v. Waterfront Commission rather [than] the transaction immunity concept of Counselman V.
Hitchcock" H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007,4018 (citations omitted); see also Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248,
276 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that Congress explicitly referred to Murphy
and La Bello in formulating the immunity statute).
266. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 927 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988 & Supp. 1994)).
267. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988 & Supp. 1994) (emphasis added). As Justice Blackmun
pointed out a decade later, the legislative history demonstrates that "Congress intended to
incorporate the 'fruit[ ][of the poisonous tree]' doctrine into the statute by use of the phrase
'directly or indirectly."' Pillsbury Co., 459 U.S. at 278 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also
infra notes 281, 283.
268. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
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using the compelled testimony in any respect," 269 the scope of the
immunity provided was coextensive with the scope of the privilege.
And it maintained that "[this] holding is consistent with the concep270
tual basis of Counselman."
Amar and Lettow have harsh words for Kastigar and for its
double conclusion that use and derivative use immunity is both constitutionally sufficient and constitutionally necessary. They assert
that Kastigar "provided no persuasive basis for stopping where it
did in fashioning its new rule" 271 and that it "failed to explain per'272
suasively where its new rule came from.
These comments are likely to leave Amar and Lettow's readers
at a loss. Amar and Lettow do not bother to tell us why they think
the Kastigar Court's explanations are unpersuasive. Nor is the
reader in any position to decide for herself, because Amar and Lettow do not even tell us what reason (persuasive or otherwise) the
Court gave for stopping where it did or what explanation (persuasive or otherwise) it offered for the genesis of its new rule. Indeed,
at one point Amar and Lettow indicate that they cannot fathom
what led the KastigarCourt to adopt the rule it did: "[W]hat, pre273
cisely, was the source of Kastigar's 'rational accommodation'?"
I find the question baffling. All one need do to discover the
source of the Kastigar rule and to learn why the Court stopped
where it did is to read the Kastigar opinion.
The basis for the immunity provision at issue in Kastigarand the
source of the Court's holding that use and derivative use immunity
provides all the protection the Fifth Amendment requires is either
(i) "the conceptual basis of Counselman... namely, that immunity
from the use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom is coextensive with the scope of the privilege," 274 or (ii) the
poisonous tree doctrine, as it applies to the Fifth Amendment. To
put it somewhat differently, the genesis of what Amar and Lettow
call Kastigar's"new rule" is either an old case or an old doctrine either Counselman, which regarded the prohibition against the derivative use of compelled statements an essential part of the Fifth
269. 406 U.S. at 453.
270. 406 U.S. at 453.
271. Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 858 (emphasis added).
272. Id. at 878 (emphasis added).
273. Id. The phrase rationalaccommodationis a reference to the Kastigar Court's statement that immunity statutes "seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the
privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify." 406 U.S.
at 446.
274. 406 U.S. at 452-53 (footnote omitted).
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Amendment and considered this prohibition built into the Amendment's exclusionary rule, 275 or the poisonous tree doctrine, which

on the eve of Kastigar was thought to apply in the Fifth Amendment context as well as in the Fourth.276
When the Counselman Court held that the Fifth Amendment

protected a witness against the derivative use of his testimony, did it
not, in effect, invoke what has come to be known as the poisonous
tree doctrine? If, as the search and seizure cases seem to say, the
poisonous tree doctrine is the corollary of an exclusionary rule,277
why shouldn't the Fifth Amendment have its own poisonous tree
doctrine? After all, the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against
compelled self-incrimination "is an exclusionary rule - and a constitutionally created one." 278 Moreover, "unlike the Fourth
Amendment, the Fifth Amendment is directly concerned with the
introduction of tainted evidence at trial; it is in fact the introduction
of such evidence that constitutes the primary violation of the
Amendment."

279

In any event, whether the poisonous tree doctrine is regarded as
an intrinsic part of the Fifth Amendment itself or as a doctrine that
275. Consider People v. Robinson, 210 N.W.2d 372 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973). Relying on
various search and seizure cases, the defendant argued that physical evidence derived from
his coerced confession should be excluded as the fruit of the poisonous tree. Relying on
Counselman and Kastigar, the court responded: "[W]hile the defendant's position is well
taken, his reasoning is erroneous. Instead of urging us to establish a Fifth Amendment
branch of the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine, he should have been arguing that such a
branch was always present as an essential element of the Fifth Amendment guarantee." 210
N.W.2d at 376 (footnote omitted).
276. See infra text accompanying notes 281-87.
277. See infra text accompanying notes 297-304 (discussing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) and Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939)).
278. Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 74, at 1214 (footnote omitted); see also Stone, supra
note 66, at 111 (noting that the Self-Incrimination Clause "by its own terms seems to dictate
the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of its commands" (footnote omitted)); The
Supreme Cour 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. Rv. 63, 222 (1968) (noting that "the fifth amendment exclusionary rule is an essential element of the constitutional right, not just a means of
enforcing the right").
279. Note, supranote 161, at 178. Thus, "[e]ven if the exclusion of evidence derived from
a coerced confession is unlikely to have a deterrent effect on the police, its introduction will
still represent an infringement on the individual's privilege against self-incrimination." Id.
(footnote omitted); see also Koontz & Stodel, supra note 238, at 378 n.164 ("It is the preclusion of incriminating uses that is the essence of the privilege; the exclusion is not just a
method to implement some other constitutional right."); Howard R. Shapiro, Note, Miranda
Without Warning: Derivative Evidence as Forbidden Fruit, 41 BRooK. L. REv. 325, 348
(1974) ("[A]dmission of evidence derived from compelled self-witness does, in effect, work
anew a compelled testimony by the accused against himself."); Note, Scope of Taint under the
Exclusionary Rule of the Fifth Amendment PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination, 114 U. PA. L.
Rzv. 570, 575 (1966) ("Because the fifth amendment exclusionary rule is more closely linked
to the rights of the particular defendant and is a more integral part of the privilege than is the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule, courts should not have the same flexibility in applying
it.").

HeinOnline -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 987 1994-1995

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 93:929

originated in the search and seizure cases and spilled over into the
Fifth Amendment area, or whether, as was said on the eve of Kastigar,the poisonous tree doctrine and Murphy v. Waterfront Commission (and other then-recent Fifth Amendment cases) "seem to
coalesce in result," 2 0 it is clear that both the Congress that enacted
the 1970 immunity statute and the Court that upheld it operated on
the premise that the poisonous tree doctrine applied to compelled
statements. 2s l
As the Court noted, the recommendation of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws "served as the model"
for the immunity statute at issue in the Kastigarcase.2m In a special
report to the President, the Chairman of the National Commission
expressed confidence that the Commission's proposal for use and
derivative use immunity would satisfy constitutional requirements
because it provided the same protection required in cases of coerced confessions or evidence otherwise unconstitutionally
obtained:
Immunity from use is the only consequence flowing from a violation
of the individual's constitutional right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, his constitutional right to counsel, and his
constitutional right not to be coerced into confessing. The proposed
immunity is thus of the same scope as that frequently, even though
280. Dixon, supra note 251, at 1424. After noting that what he calls "unintentional immunity" is "frequently conferred" on defendants by excluding "illegally seized evidence and
the fruits thereof," id.at 1419, and after calling the immunity rule suggested in Murphy barring prosecutorial use of compelled testimony and its fruits - "an exclusionary rule ...
based on the fifth amendment... parallel to the judicially announced and judicially policed
[search and seizure] exclusionary rule," id. at 1423-24, Professor Dixon continues: "Thus,
under recent fifth amendment jurisprudence... the due process 'coerced confession' line of
cases, the fourth amendment cases, and the fifth amendment line of cases seem to coalesce in
result, even though there may be underlying doctrinal differences." Id. at 1424.
As the Kastigar Court noted, the recommendation of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws "served as the model" for the federal immunity statute at
issue in Kastigar,and the Commission's recommendation "was based in large part" on the
comprehensive study of immunity by Dixon quoted above. Kastigar, 406 U.S. 441,452 n.36

(1972).
281. As for the Court, see Kastigar,406 U.S. at 461-62. As for Congress, see the discussion of the legislative history of § 6002 in Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 276-78
(1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring). As Justice Blackmun points out:
Section 6002's prohibition against the use of compelled testimony or "any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony" reflected Congress' view of the
extent of the Fifth Amendment privilege. According to the House and Senate Reports,
the phrase was chosen to conform to "present law" on the "use of evidence derivatively
obtained." The Reports then cite Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the
seminal case on what is commonly known as the "fruits" doctrine, as representing "present law."
459 U.S. at 276-77; see also infra note 283.
282. 406 U.S. at 452 n.36; see also supra note 280.
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as the result of constitutional violations by
unintentionally, conferred283
law enforcement officers.
When the immunity provision at issue in Kastigarwas attacked
on the ground that a statute had to grant full transactional immunity in order for it to be coextensive with the scope of the privilege,
the Court responded - as had the Congress and the National
Commission earlier - by pointing to the poisonous tree doctrine:
The statutory proscription is analogous to the Fifth Amendment
requirement in cases of coerced confessions. A coerced confession, as
revealing of leads as testimony given in exchange for immunity, is
inadmissible in a criminal trial, but it does not bar prosecution. Moreover, a defendant against whom incriminating evidence has been obtained through a grant of immunity may be in a stronger position at
trial than a defendant who asserts a Fifth Amendment coercedconfession claim.... [The latter defendant] must first prevail in a
voluntariness hearing before his confession and evidence derivedfrom

it become inadmissible.
There can be no justification in reason or policy for holding that
the Constitution requires an amnesty grant where ...

testimony is

compelled in exchange for immunity from use and derivative use
when no such amnesty is required where the government, acting without colorable right, coerces a defendant into incriminating himself. 4
There is no mystery about why the Congress that enacted the
1970 immunity statute and the Court that upheld it went as far as
they did but no further. Congress and the Court went as far as they
did in protecting a witness compelled to testify in exchange for immunity because they believed they had to go that far in order to
"leave[ ] the witness and the prosecutorial authorities in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed the Fifth
Amendment privilege"8 5 - just as they thought the poisonous tree
doctrine left a defendant who had been the victim of unconstitutional police conduct in substantially the same position as if the police had not violated his rights.
Congress and the Court went as far as they did because the poisonous tree doctrine went that far. To use Amar and Lettow's lan283. This portion of the special report to the President is quoted by the KastigarCourt.
See 406 U.S. at 452 n.36. For the full text of this document, see 2 WORCING PAPERS OF THE
NATIONAL COMrMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRMINA. LAws 1445-47 (1970).

A decade later, Justice Blackmun noted that when it enacted the immunity statute sustained in Kastigar,"Congress understood" that the Fifth Amendment prohibited the use of a
coerced confession or its fruits, and, "as the legislative history demonstrates, Congress intended to incorporate the 'fruits' doctrine into the statute by use of the phrase 'directly or
indirectly derived."' Pillsbury Co., 459 U.S. at 278 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also supra
notes 267, 281.
284. 406 U.S. at 461-62 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
285. 406 U.S. at 462.
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guage, Congress and the Court "stopped" where they did because
that was where the poisonous tree doctrine "stopped. '28 6 Neither
Congress nor the Court could see any reason to give a witness who
was compelled to testify absolute or transactional immunity "when
no such amnesty is required where the government ...coerces a
defendant into incriminating himself.' '287
IV.

INADMISSIBLE CONFESSIONS AND THE POISONOUS TREE

DocriNE

As noted earlier, 288 it does not appear that the Supreme Court
has ever specifically addressed the question whether or under what
circumstances physical evidence derived from a coerced confession
is admissible. At first blush the Court's failure to do so seems
astonishing. But on reflection the failure becomes more
understandable.
A. The Rule of Automatic Reversal
For most of the life of the due process coerced confession doctrine, the "rule of automatic reversal" governed - that is, the erroneous admission of a coerced confession necessitated reversal
regardless of how much evidence, tainted or untainted, remained to
support the conviction 289 Not until 1991 did a closely divided
Court hold for the first time that the admission of a coerced confes290
sion is subject to harmless error analysis.
286. A decade later, after canvassing the House and Senate Reports and other evidence
of legislative intent, Justice Blackmun concluded:
It seems to me that Congress made its intent clear. First, it intended to grant only the
minimum protection required by the Constitution. Second, it believed that the protection constitutionally requited in cases of compelled testimony was identical to the protection required in cases of coerced statements or evidence otherwise illegally obtained.
Pillsbury Co.; 459 U.S. at 278 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
287. 406 U.S. at 461-62.
288. See supra note 52.
289. The rule of automatic reversal held sway in the coerced confessions area "[a]t least
since Malinski v. New York [324 U.S. 401,404 (1945)]." Allen, supranote 100, at 45; see also
Kamisar, supra note 31, at 7-8.
Moreover, the rule of automatic reversal may have applied to coerced confessions even
before the 1945 Malinski case: "Prior to the 1960s, it was generally assumed that constitutional violations could never be regarded as harmless error." 3 LAFAvE & IsRAEL, supra
note 43, § 26.6, at 270; see also Charles J.Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of
Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARv. L. Rav. 152, 157 (1991)
("[P]rior to 1967, the Supreme Court routinely reversed convictions upon a finding of constitutional error." (footnote omitted)).
290. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). For powerful criticism of Fulminante, see Ogletree, supra note 289.
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During the long reign of the rule of automatic reversal, whenever a defendant claimed that her coerced confession had been erroneously admitted, there was, of course, no need to determine
whether the physical evidence in the case was derived from or independent of the coerced confession. If the confession fell, so did
the conviction.
Consider, for example, Culombe v. Connecticut.291 After admitting his i'volvement in a felony murder, the defendant led the police to a place where certain weapons were concealed, to a swampy
area where the defendant and a confederate had disposed of another weapon, and to another swampy area where a raincoat said to
have been worn on the night of the crime was recovered. 292 But
there was no need for the Court to consider whether these items
were the inadmissible fruits of the confession. And it did not do so.
Justice Frankfurter, who announced the judgment of the Court,
pointed out: "If [the confessions] were coerced [and they were],
Culombe's conviction, however convincingly supported by other evidence, cannot stand." 293
To be sure, the rule of automatic reversal does not explain why
the Supreme Court has never addressed the question of the admissibility of physical evidence in a case where the police extracted a
coerced confession from the defendant but the prosecution did not
offer the confession in evidence. But I know of no Supreme Court
case fitting that description. Nor does the rule of automatic reversal explain why the Court never dealt with the admissibility of derivative evidence in a case where a defendant whose confession was
overturned the first time around was tried again and reconvicted
without the confession. But I know of only one such case that
and it turned out to be an embarreached the Court a second time,
294
rassment for the prosecution.
291. 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
292. 367 U.S. at 615-16.
293. 367 U.S. at 621. However, at the outset of his long opinion - perhaps as a warning
to the prosecution that a retrial would be pointless - Justice Frankfurter made the pregnant
comment that at the trial of Culombe and his co-defendant, "no evidence of any importance
was presented by the State that did not derive, directly or indirectly, from the confessions and
disclosures obtained from the two men." 367 U.S. at 569 n.1.
294. In the first Ashcraft case, Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), the defendant's
conviction was reversed because his written confession had been obtained after some thirtysix hours of almost continuous interrogation. The defendant was later retried and reconvicted. Again the Supreme Court reversed. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 (1946).
The second conviction rested in large part on oral statements the defendant had made disclosing that he had deliberately concealed the identity of his wife's murderer for ten days.
The Court saw "no relevant distinction" between these statements and the written confession
struck down the first time the case had reached the Supreme Court. See 327 U.S. at 278.
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Once an appellate court has ruled that a confession introduced
at trial was coerced, the victim of such a confession is apparently
not retried very often. Why not? Many times, the prosecution may
not have enough evidence to obtain a conviction without the confession. Moreover, aware that an appellate court would probably
take a long, hard look at a conviction obtained without a confession
when the confession had previously been found to be the product of
serious police misconduct, the prosecution will not be eager to subject the case - and other police conduct in the case - to further
appellate court scrutiny.
B. The Prosecutor'sReluctance To Withhold a Confession
Let us put retrials aside. If a confession is arguably coerced,
why not decline to offer it in evidence and prosecute the case without it? It seems that rarely, if ever, will a prosecutor feel confident
Thus "[a]ll the reasons given for reversal of the judgment against Ashcraft in the first case,
which we need not repeat, apply with equal force here." 327 U.S. at 279.
Cf. Nix v. Williams (Williams 11), 467 U.S. 431 (1984); see also infra text accompanying
notes 330-54 (discussing Williams 11). In Williams II, the Supreme Court overturned the
defendant's first murder conviction because it rested in part on statements obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. At the retrial, the body of the victim was
admitted into evidence, but not the defendant's statements nor the fact that he had led the
police to the body. The state established that a search party would have found the body in a
short time even if the defendant had not disclosed its whereabouts. This time the Supreme
Court upheld the conviction on the ground that the discovery of the body came within the
inevitable discovery exception to the poisonous tree doctrine. 467 U.S. at 448-50. But the
Court operated on the premise that the poisonous tree doctrine did apply to physical evidence derived from statements obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.
Consider, too, Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 318-20. The Court held that the defendant's testimony at his first trial - a
case that did not reach the Supreme Court - could not be used against him at his retrial
because it was the fruit of wrongfully obtained confessions improperly admitted into evidence at his first trial. 392 U.S. at 225-26.
Ernest Miranda, the defendant in the most famous confession case of all, was retried and
reconvicted without the confession the Supreme Court had held inadmissible in Miranda.
But his second conviction was not reviewed by the Supreme Court and, of course, his confession to the police had not been coerced. Miranda's second conviction was based largely on
an oral confession he had made to a woman with whom he was living at the time (Mrs.
Hoffnan), and he contended that this confession was the fruit of the confession invalidated
by the U.S. Supreme Court. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Arizona, which affirmed
Miranda's second conviction, proceeded on the premise that the poisonous tree doctrine did
apply to the fruits of inadmissible confessions. But it concluded that "there was a sufficient
'break in the stream of events' between the confession to the police and the confession to
Mrs. Hoffman" to allow her testimony. State v. Miranda, 450 P.2d 364, 373 (Ariz. 1969).
Interestingly, too, the Arizona Supreme Court's opinion foreshadowed developments in
the U.S. Supreme Court:
Certainly the nature of the illegality which gives rise to the "fruits" must be considered in determining whether the evidence obtained is "tainted." H6re, the violation was
a failure to warn of constitutional rights which did not exist until sometime subsequent
to the conduct. Certainly such a "taint" should be more easily "attenuated" than conduct more clearly proscribed by our Constitution.
450 P.2d at 373 (citation omitted).
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that her case is so strong that she can afford to keep out the confession or other incriminating statements. She may remember the
time when a seemingly overwhelming case for the State resulted in
an acquittal or "hung jury." She may remember the time, after she
lost a case in which there were no confessions or incriminating
statements, when the jury clustered around her or the judge and
asked whether the defendant ever admitted his guilt.295 She may be
convinced that "in the absence of a confession, seeds of doubt are
likely to remain in the minds of the public and of jurors despite
'296
overwhelming evidence.
C. Nardone
I think there is another reason why the Supreme Court never
had occasion to determine the admissibility of physical evidence derived from a coerced confession. For much of the life of the doctrine, many (perhaps most) prosecutors and many (perhaps most)
lower court judges probably assumed that the poisonous tree doctrine barred the use of such evidence and acted accordingly.
After all, only three years after it had handed down its first
Fourteenth Amendment due process coerced confession case,2 97 the
Court decided Nardone v. United States,298 the case that coined the

phrase fruit of the poisonous tree.299 The Nardone Court refused to
295. As Richard Kuh, a former prosecuting attorney and a well-known commentator on
criminal procedure, remarked shortly after Mirandawas decided:
The prosecutor's duty is to present all the legally admissible evidence that can be fairly
collected and presented and that he believes to be necessary and helpful in sustaining his
considerable burden. Prosecutors may then be put in an impossible position when they
have a confession in an otherwise weak case.... It is all very well to suggest that, despite
the rulings of a trial court sustaining the use of a defendant's statements, the prosecutor
should play it safe and not use the confession. However, when, so doing, he finds himself with an acquittal that might have been avoided had he used the admissions, has he
done his job? To those who believe that, in many cases, prosecutors probably could
obtain convictions without confessions and are "overtrying" their cases, I would suggest
reading trial records in cases in which there have been acquittals or "hung juries." It is a
revelation to observe the apparently overwhelming evidence and yet the seemingly
"wrong" result at which the jury will sometimes arrive. It is much easier to fall into the
habit of saying that certain evidence was not necessary if, as do the appellate courts, one
reads only records of convictions.
i'suggest, moreover, that it is human nature... to want to know if a defendant has
"owned up to his crime." After the trial of cases in which there were no confessions, I
have seen jurors cluster around the judge or counsel and ask whether the defendant ever
admitted his guilt.
Richard H. Kuh, Interrogationof CriminalDefendants - Some views on Miranda v. Arizona,
35 FoRDHAM L. REv. 233, 238, 240 (1966).
296. Ld.
at 240.
297. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
298. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
299. See 308 U.S. at 341.
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permit the government to avoid an inquiry into its use of information gained by illegal wiretapping, observing that to forbid the direct use of methods prohibited by the federal wiretap statute "but
to put no curb on their full indirect use would only invite the very
methods deemed 'inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty.' -"3o
At no point in his opinion for the Court did Justice Frankfurter
suggest that the Court was invoking its supervisory powers over
federal criminal justice. Nor at any point did Frankfurter suggest
that there was anything special or peculiar about the wording or the
legislative history of the antiwiretapping statute.
The doctrine applied in Nardone - and given the name by
which it has ever since been known - had its genesis in a 1920
search and seizure case, SilverthorneLumber Co. v. United States. 301
Justice Frankfurter deemed what was said in Silverthorne "pertinent" and quoted it: "'The essence of a provision forbidding the
acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence
so acquired shall not be used before the Court, but that it shall not
be used at all.' ,,302 "Here, as in the Silverthorne case," added
Frankfurter, improperly obtained facts may still be used "'[i]f
knowledge of them is gained from an independent source.., but
the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be
used by it' simply because it is used derivatively."30 3
Taken together, Silverthorne and Nardone seem to stand for the
general proposition that when the police obtain evidence by committing a constitutional or federal statutory violation, they cannot
use knowledge acquired by their wrongful conduct simply because
it is used derivatively. The Silverthorne-Nardone doctrine - and
until the 1960s these were the only two Supreme Court cases to apply or discuss the poisonous tree doctrine - "is a response to the
realization that if police officers are permitted to use knowledge
gained from unlawfully obtained evidence to obtain the same or
300. 308 U.S. at 340 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937)). Nardone also established the "attenuation" doctrine, being the first case to recognize that even
where the challenged derivative evidence did not have an independent source, it might still
be admissible. See 308 U.S. at 341 ("Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection
between information obtained through illicit wire-tapping and the Government's proof. As a
matter of good sense, however, such connection may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.").
301. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
302. 308 U.S. at 340-41 (quoting Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392) (emphasis added).
303. 308 U.S. at 341 (quoting Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392) (emphasis added).
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other valuable evidence legally, an inducement to commit such unlawful practices continues to exist."304
D. Wong Sun
Perhaps the Nardone rationale explains the result in Wong Sun
v. United States.305 Although for many years "it ha[d] been hornbook law that the illegality of an arrest does not operate to exclude
'30 6
an otherwise admissible confession or incriminating statement,
the government in Wong Sun conceded that if the statements the
defendant had made to federal narcotics agents in his bedroom
were held to be the fruits of his illegal arrest, the statements had to
be excluded.307 Justice Brennan, who wrote the opinion of the
Court, recognized that the exclusionary rule "has traditionally
barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during
or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion 308 but held that "verbal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry
and an unauthorized arrest as the officers' action in the present case
is no less the 'fruit' of official illegality than the more common tan'309
gible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion.
Although Wong Sun is best known as the case that applied the
poisonous tree doctrine to verbal evidence derived from a Fourth
Amendment violation, another aspect of the case is noteworthy:
The Court also applied the poisonous tree doctrine to bar the use of
physical evidence derived from the defendant's inadmissible
statements.
When apprehended by the agents, the defendant told them
about a third party who had been selling drugs and told them where
he lived. When confronted by the agents shortly thereafter, the
third party surrendered some heroin and told the agents that the
narcotics had been provided by the defendant. 310 The Court held
that the narcotics as well as the defendant's statements had to be
304. Comment, Fruitof the Poisonous Tree - A Plea for Relevant Criteria,115 U. PA. L.
1136, 1138 (1967) (footnote omitted).

REv.

305. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

306. Yale Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and ContemporaneousIncriminatingStatements: A Dialogue on a Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure 1961 U. ILL L.F. 78, 84.

Balbo v. People, 80 N.Y. 484 (1880), was the first and, for many decades, the leading American case on the lack of effect of a wrongful arrest on the admissibility of a contemporaneous
or subsequent incriminating statement. See Kamisar, supra, at 106-15.
307. 371 U.S. at 484.
308. 371 U.S. at 485.
309. 371 U.S. at 485 (footnote omitted).
310. 371 U.S. at 474-75.
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excluded because "the narcotics were 'come at by the exploitation
of [the primary] illegality.' "311
Evidently the Court regarded the narcotics turned over to the
agents by the third party as the somewhat distant fruits of the unconstitutional arrest. The narcotics may also be viewed as the more
312
immediate fruits of the unconstitutionally obtained statements.
313
But why should it matter which way the situation is viewed?
Let us change the facts of Wong Sun. Suppose the federal
agents had lawfully arrested the defendant. Suppose further that
they then had extracted a coerced confession from him and that this
confession had led them to a third party who surrendered narcotics
and implicated the defendant. It is hard to believe that the Court
would have upheld the admissibility of the narcotics on these
changed facts, just because the acquisition of the narcotics was contaminated by a due process or Fifth Amendment violation rather
than by a Fourth Amendment violation.
When Justice Brennan observed in Wong Sun that "the policies
underlying the exclusionary rule [do not] invite any logical distinction between physical and verbal evidence,"314 he was speaking of
the fruits of the poisonous tree, not the poisonous tree itself. But
why shouldn't this observation apply to the poisonous tree as well?
Once it is kept in mind that a principal - if not the dominant rationale for barring the use of coerced confessions is condemnation and discouragement of the lawless police methods that brought
about the confession, 315 how can it be said that the policies underlying the confession and search or seizure exclusionary rules invite a
logical distinction?
As Justice Brennan told us in Wong Sun, "[e]ither in terms of
deterring lawless [police] conduct.., or of closing the [courtroom]
doors... to any use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained, the
311. 371 U.S. at 488.
312. As the Court pointed out in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), "It is settled law

that 'a confession obtained through custodial interrogation after an illegal arrest should be
excluded unless intervening events break the causal connection between the illegal arrest and
the confession so that the confession is "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary
taint." '"..
470 U.S. at 306 (quoting Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982) (quoting
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 (1975))).
313. Interestingly, Professor Pitler, author of one of the leading articles on the poisonous
tree doctrine, describes Wong Sun both ways. At one point he states that "[t]he Court held
that the narcotics were the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' - A's illegal arrest." Pitler, supra
note *, at 593. A page later, he describes Wong Sun as a case holding that "the narcotics
seized from B could not be used as evidence against A" because "[t]hey were fruit of the
illegally obtained statement of A." Id.at 594.
314. 371 U.S. at 486.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 37-44, 62-64, 68-71.
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danger in relaxing the exclusionary rules in the case of verbal evidence [as opposed to physical, tangible fruits] would seem too great
to warrant introducing such a distinction. ' 316 But when we remember that for more than three decades the police methods test has
been the primary rationale for excluding coerced confessions, 317 the
danger in relaxing the exclusionary rule in the case of a coerced
confession rather than an unlawful search would also seem too
great to warrant a distinction.
E. Harrison v. United States
Five years after Wong Sun, in Harrisonv. United States,318 the
Court invoked the poisonous tree doctrine again. The Court did
not view the doctrine as limited to the search and seizure setting in
which it was born, nor did it apply the doctrine sparingly. Justice
Stewart, writing for a 6-3 majority, held that the petitioner's former
trial testimony should not have been used at his second trial because he had testified in his own defense at his first trial only in an
effort to minimize the impact of three confessions that were improperly admitted. It is indisputable that the Court read the
Silverthome-Nardone-Wong Sun line of cases broadly as standing
for the general proposition that the government cannot introduce
evidence acquired as a result of police misconduct simply because it
is used derivatively.
Harrison arose as follows: At the petitioner's first trial, the
prosecution introduced three confessions in which he allegedly admitted the shotgun slaying of a robbery victim. Following the admission of these confessions, the petitioner took the witness stand
and testified to his own version of events. In the course of his testimony, he admitted that he had been at the scene of the killing,
weapon in hand. The court of appeals reversed his conviction on
the ground that the confessions should have been excluded because
they were obtained in violation of the McNabb-Mallory rule. 319 On
316. 371 U.S. at 486 (citations omitted).
317. See supra text accompanying notes 37-44.
318. 392 U.S. 219 (1968).

319. 392 U.S. at 220-21. In McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), the Court held,
in the exercise of its supervisory authority over the administration of federal criminal justice,
that voluntary confessions should be excluded from evidence if they were obtained while the
suspect was being held in violation of federal requirements that he be promptly taken before
a committing magistrate. Some years later, the Court revived and reaffirmed McNabb, first
in Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948), and then in Mallory v. United States, 354
U.S. 449 (1957). From 1957 on, the rule was often called the McNabb-Mallory rule or simply
the Mallory rule. But the storm of controversy over the rule never subsided. See James E.
Hogan & Joseph M. Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47
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retrial, the petitioner's previous trial testimony was used against
him over his objection that he had been induced to testify at his first
trial only because of the government's use of his inadmissible confessions. The petitioner was again convicted, and the court of appeals affirmed the conviction.
The Supreme Court reversed the petitioner's second conviction
on the ground that his preious testimony was the inadmissible fruit
of the illegally procured confessions. The fact that the original
"contaminated" source consisted of three wrongfully obtained confessions - rather than an illegal arrest or unlawfully seized physical
evidence - was not deemed worthy of discussion. Writing for the
Court, Justice Stewart quickly, and without analytical hesitation, invoked what he obviously considered a generalprinciple:
[Pletitioner testified only after the Government had illegally introduced into evidence three confessions, all wrongfully obtained, and
the same principle that prohibits the use of confessions so procured
also prohibits the use of any testimony impelled thereby - the fruit
of the poisonous tree, to invoke a time-worn metaphor. For the "essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain
way is that ... it shall not be used at all." Silverthorne ....
... If [the petitioner testified at his first trial] in order to overcome

the impact of confessions illegally obtained and hence improperly introduced, then his testimony was tainted by the same illegality that
rendered the confessions themselves inadmissible. 320
Harrison demonstrates that the basic principles underlying
Silverthorne,Nardone, and Wong Sun have not been and should not
be limited to unconstitutional searches and illegal taps. 321 Nevertheless, considering the case's particular facts, it must be said that
GEo. L.J. 1, 5,17 (1958); see also Fred E. Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States
Supreme Court; 43 ILL L. REv. 442 (1948). Many bills were introduced to repeal or at least
soften the rule, and in 1968, a law was finally enacted that severely cut back on it. See Pub. L.
No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 210 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (a), (c) (1988)). Some
aspects of the 1968 law are discussed in United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 114 S. Ct. 1599
(1994).
At no point in his opinion for the Court in Harrisondid Justice Stewart suggest that the
Court was barring the fruits of the McNabb-Mallory violations in the exercise of its supervisory power over federal criminal justice.
320. 392 U.S. at 222-23 (footnotes omitted). In a footnote, the Court bolstered the reference to Silverthorne with citations to Nardone and Wong Sun. See 392 U.S. at 222-23 n.7.
321. According to the MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Am. Law
Inst., Tentative Draft No. 1, 1966):
[T]he basic principles underlying Silverthorne and Nardone cannot justifiably be limited
to illegal searches and wiretaps. It is hard to see why the "fruits" doctrine should apply
to the products of an illegal search and yet be totally inapplicable to the products of
police violations, such as confessions obtained by physical abuse, which may be fully as
abhorrent and in need of deterrence.
Id. § 9.09 cmt. at 216 (footnote omitted).

HeinOnline -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 998 1994-1995

March 1995]

The Fruits of Compelled and Coerced Statements

999

Harrisonwould probably be decided differently today - for reasons that provide no comfort to Amar and Lettow.

The poisonous tree in Harrisonconsisted of mere McNabb-Mallory violations, 3z2 not coerced confessions, and in Elstad the Court
indicated that nowadays the poisonous tree doctrine only applies to
3 The Elstad
evidence stemming from constitutional violations. 23
Court repeatedly compared and contrasted violations of the
"prophylactic Mirandaprocedures" unaccompanied by "actual coercion" with "police infringement[s] of the Fifth Amendment
24
itself."3
Secondly, Harrisonwas a case in which the fruits hung a considerable distance from the trunk of the poisonous tree. More specifically, I think a majority of the present Court Would conclude - as
the dissenters maintained in Harrison- that the exclusion of the
derivative evidence would have little or no deterrent value, because
it was highly unlikely that the police officers who violated the petitioner's rights foresaw his testimony at his first trial as a product of
their illegality.325 According to dissenting Justice White:
[I]t cannot realistically be supposed that the police are spurred on to
greater illegality by any rational supposition that success in that illicit
endeavor will make it more likely that the defendant will make incriminatory admissions on the witness stand. If this is the case...
322. In some respects, the McNabb Court tried to do for the federal courts what, a quarter-century later, Miranda was designed to do for state as well as federal courts: bypass the
frustrating "swearing contests" over the nature of the secret interrogation and reduce, if not
eliminate, both police temptation and opportunity to coerce incriminating statements. The
McNabb doctrine sought to do so by focusing on a relatively objective factor - the length of
time a suspect was held by the police before being brought to a judicial officer to be advised
of his rights.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 196-203. Interestingly, the Eistad Court apparently viewed Harrisonas a coerced confession case, and, as such, still good law. See Oregon
v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316-17 (1985) ("If the prosecution has actually violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights by introducing an inadmissible confession at trial, compelling
the defendant to testify in rebuttal, the rule announced in Harrisonv. United States precludes
use of that testimony on retrial." (citation omitted)).
324. See supra text accompanying note 201. In a sense, Justice White, who dissented in
Harrison, foreshadowed later developments, such as ElstadL He observed: "[P]etitioner's
statements were wrongfully admitted, not because they were involuntary or in any way coerced, but because they violated Mallory... ." 392 U.S. at 229. He continued:
Even if it were true that the rule adopted by the Court served some minimal deterrent function, I would not be able to join the Court. Marginal considerations such as
these, especially when one is dealing with confessions excludable because of violation of
the technical requirements of cases like Mallory ... and Miranda[] are insufficient to
override the interest in presenting all evidence which is relevant and probative.
392 U.S. at 232-33 (citations omitted).
325. But see Stanley Hirtle, Inadmissible Confessions and Their Fruits: A Comment on
Harrison v. United States, 60 J. CRM. L. & CRnMNoLoY 58, 63 (1969) (arguing that the

prosecutors in Harrisonwere intentionally exploiting an illegality by using "the testimony
caused by the confessions... as a substitute for" the confessions, and that such behavior
might influence future police conduct).

HeinOnline -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 999 1994-1995

1000

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 93:929

then suppression of the petitioner's testimony, even if it was in fact
induced by the wrongful admission into evidence of an illegal confession, does not remove
a source of further temptation to the police to
326
[act lawlessly].
But this argument has no application to the cases Amar and
Lettow have in mind - cases in which the police coerce a suspect
into revealing the location of the murder weapon or the proceeds of
a bank robbery or the wallet of a mugging victim. In these instances the connection between the fruits and the primary illegality
has not "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint."3 27 The
derivative evidence, rather, is the probable and foreseeable product
of the primary illegality - and a motivating force behind it. As
one commentator recently observed, in reliance on four different
interrogation manuals: "Expert interrogators have long recognized,
and continue to instruct, that a confession is a primary source for
determining the existence and whereabouts of the fruits of a crime,
such as documents or weapons." 328
Amar and Lettow do not challenge the view that a principal
purpose

-

if not the primary purpose -

of interrogation is to ob-

tain information such as the location of physical evidence. Indeed,
they agree, evidently regarding this as a reason for admitting evidence derived from coerced confessions. "[P]hysical leads," they
note at one point, "are often more important to law enforcement
'3 29
than getting statements for use in court.
F. Nix v. Williams (Williams II)
One Supreme Court confession case, Nix v. Williams (Williams
II),330 remains to be considered. Although this case did not involve
the fruits of a coerced confession, it comes close.
326. 392 U.S. at 232.
327. As Justice Frankfurter noted in Nardone, at some point the connection between the
original contaminated source and the information derived from it "may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." 308 U.S. at 341; see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
328. Wollin, supra note *,at 845 (footnote omitted).
329. Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 922 n.286 (citing Friendly, supra note 10, at 712
n.176 (citing B. James George, Jr., An Unsettled Question, in A NEw LOOK AT CoNFESSIONS
115, 121 (B. James George, Jr., ed., 1967))). Professor George states:

Police can question suspects either (1) to obtain statements that they can later present in
court as evidence, or (2) to obtain leads from a suspect on the basis of which they can
discover real or demonstrative evidence, or identify prosecution witnesses .... What
data there are suggest that the latter objective is usually more important to law enforcement than the former.
George, supra, at 121.
330. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
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Williams, an Iowa defendant, was suspected of murdering a tenyear-old girl. He made incriminating statements to the police and
led them to the ditch where the body was hidden. 331 The first time
the case reached the Court, in Brewer v. Williams (Williams I),332
the conviction was reversed on the ground that the defendant's
statements had been obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel or, more specifically, the Massiah doctrine. 333 But
the Court noted that if Williams were retried, "evidence of where
the body was found and of its condition might well be admissible on
the theory that the body would have been discovered in any event,
even had incriminating statements not been elicited from
Williams."1334

Williams was retried and reconvicted. At the second trial
neither his statements nor the fact that he had directed the police to
the child's body was offered in evidence. However, when the state
established by a preponderance of the evidence that a large search
party would have discovered the body within a short time in essentially the same condition as it was actually found even if no statements had been obtained from Williams, evidence concerning the
335
body's location and condition was admitted.
In Williams I, the Court affirmed the defendant's second conviction, adopting an "inevitable discovery" exception to the poisonous tree doctrine. 336 Earlier Supreme Court cases had recognized
an "independent source" exception, admitting derivative evidence
if knowledge of it had been obtained from a legitimate source independent of the police misconduct. 337 The Court viewed the inevi331. 467 U.S. at 436.
332. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). For a detailed study of the often-confusing record in Williams I
and extensive discussion of the issues raised by this case, see Yale Kamisar, Foreword.
Brewer v. Williams - A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record, 66 GEo. L.J. 209 (1977),
reprinted in KAMisA, supra note 7, at 113, and Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda:
What Is "Interrogation"? When Does It Matter?,67 GEo. L.J. 1 (1978), reprintedin KsAMAS,
supra note 7, at 139.
333. 430 U.S. at 406. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), as clarified and arguably expanded in Williams I, establishes that once adversary proceedings have commenced
against an individual - for example, once he has been indicted or arraigned - government
efforts to "deliberately elicit" incriminating statements from him, whether done openly by
uniformed police officers or surreptitiously by secret agents, violate the individual's right to
counsel. 430 U.S. at 398-401.
334. 430 U.S. at 407 n.12.
335. 467 U.S. at 437-39. For an excellent "roadmap" to both Williams cases, see Phillip E.
Johnson, The Return of the "Christian BurialSpeech" Case, 32 EMORY L.i. 349 (1983).
336. See 467 U.S. at 448. Although Williams II marked the first time the Court recognized the inevitable discovery exception, as the Court noted, the vast majority of lower courts
had already done so. See 467 U.S. at 440.
337. 467 U.S. at 441-44.

HeinOnline -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1001 1994-1995

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 93:929

table discovery exception - sometimes called the "hypothetical
independent source" rule - as only a slight variation on the in3 38
dependent source exception.
Although Williams II held that the discovery of the body came
within the inevitable discovery exception, the case should provide
no comfort to Amar and Lettow. Neither the State of Iowa nor any
member of the Court thought it noteworthy that physical evidence
does not "testify" or that corpses do not "speak. '339 Although the
physical evidence included "the results of post mortem medical and
chemical tests on the body," 40 neither the State nor any Justice
thought Schmerber relevant. Neither the Court nor any of the
briefs cited Schmerber at all.
Nobody suggested, as Amar and Lettow contend, that the law
should "simply presume - irrebuttably - that somehow, some
way, the truth and the fruit might have to come to light anyway."'341
Every member of the Court, as well as the State, operated on the
premise that unless the linkage between Williams's inadmissible
statements and the physical evidence were severed, the evidence
would have to be excluded.
Early in his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger made
plain that he viewed the Silverthorne-WongSun line of cases as representing a capacious principle:
The doctrine requiring courts to suppress evidence as the tainted
"fruit" of unlawful governmental conduct had its genesis in
Silverthome ....
Wong Sun extended the exclusionary rule to evidence that was the
indirect product or "fruit" of unlawfulpolice conduct,but there again
the Court emphasized that evidence that has been illegally obtained
need not always be suppressed ....
338. See 467 U.S. at 443-44. A number of commentators would sharply disagree with this
rather benign characterization of the inevitable discovery exception. For strong criticism of
this exception, especially if it is applied loosely, see Pitler, supra note *,at 627-30; Jeffrey M.
Bain & Michael K. Kelly, Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: Recent Developments as
Viewed Through Its Exceptions, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 615, 625-29 (1977); and The Supreme
Court, 1983 Term-Leading Cases, 98 HARv.L. REv. 87, 124-30 (1984).
339. Cf.Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 888-89, 900.
340. 467 U.S. at 437.
341. Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 880. Elsewhere, Amar asks:
[S]hould not the law strongly presume that somehow, some way, sometime, the truth
would come out? Criminals get careless or cocky; conspirators rat; neighbors come forward; cops get lucky; the truth outs; and justice reigns - or so our courts should presume, and any party seeking to suppress truth and thwart justice should bear a heavy
burden of proof.
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles,107 HARv.L. Rny. 757, 794 (1994)
(footnote omitted).
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Although Silverthorne and Wong Sun involved violations of the
Fourth Amendment, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine has not
been limited to cases in which there has been a Fourth Amendment
violation. The Court has applied the doctrine where the violations
were of the Sixth Amendment as well as of the Fifth Amendment.342
Williams II cites Murphy and Kastigar,not only as cases illustrating the application of the poisonous tree doctrine, but also as
cases adopting the independent source exception.3 43 In rejecting
the contention that use and derivative use immunity inadequately
protects a witness from various possible incriminating uses of the
compelled testimony, the Kastigar Court had pointed out that the
prohibition on derivative use "barr[ed] the use of compelled testimony as an 'investigatory lead' ,,344 and that once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified under an immunity grant, the
authorities must show that "their evidence is not tainted by establishing that they had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence. 3 45 This, the Kastigar Court told us, "is very
substantial protection, commensurate with that resulting from...
' '346
the privilege itself.
The Court's references to Murphy and Kastigarare not surprising. In successfully urging the Court to adopt an inevitable discovery exception and to use it to admit the disputed evidence, the State
of Iowa relied on Kastigar- the case Amar and Lettow dislike so
much - and quoted language from that case to assure the Court
that neither an independent source nor an inevitable discovery exception would "eviscerate the exclusionary rule":347
The State is still required to show what amounts to an "independent,
legitimate source" for disputed evidence, a requirement which this
Court, in a similar context, has characterized as "a substantial protection" against abuse. See Kastigar .... Any evidence that has been
obtained by illegal means which would not inevitably4 8 or independently have been discovered is still subject to its bite.
But Amar and Lettow would admit physical evidence derived
from a coerced confession even though the evidence would not have
been discovered inevitably or independently. Williams II empha342. 467 U.S. at 441-42 (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52 (1964), and
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972)) (emphasis added) (footnote and citations
omitted).
343. See 467 U.S. at 442 n.3.
344. 406 U.S. at 460 (footnote omitted).
345. 406 U.S. at 460 (quoting Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79 n.18).
346. 406 U.S. at 461 (footnote omitted).
347. Brief of Petitioner at 21, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (No. 82-1651).
348. Id. (emphasis added).
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sized that the independent source and inevitable discovery exceptions are not inconsistent with the rationale behind the exclusionary
rule, because the rationale is that "the prosecution is not to be put
in a better position than it would have been in if no illegality had
transpired, 349 and the independent source and inevitable discovery
exceptions do not really do that. If the evidence would have been
lawfully obtained in any event, the exceptions only put the prosecution "in the same, not a worse, position tha[n] they would have been
in if no police... misconduct had occurred. '350 However, because
Amar and Lettow would admit the tangible fruits of a coerced confession regardless of whether they would have been discovered in
any event, their approach would often place the government in a
better position than it would have enjoyed if no unconstitutional police action had taken place.
I realize that the disputed evidence in Williams I grew out of a
Massiah violation 351 rather than a coerced confession. But why
should that matter? The Court told us in Williams I that the poisonous tree doctrine applies to violations of the Fifth Amendment
as well as those of the Fourth and Sixth. 352 And it considered the
Fifth Amendment immunity cases relevant in discussing the issues
raised by that case. Why would it disregard these Fifth Amendment
cases when confronted by the tangible fruits of a coerced confession
a Fifth Amendment violation in its most pristine form?
Moreover, a coerced confession will almost always constitute
more purposeful and more flagrant police misconduct than a Massiah violation.353 The more serious the police lawlessness, the wider
35 4
the sweep of the poisonous tree doctrine should be.
349. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984).
350. 406 U.S. at 443.
351. See supra note 333.
352. See supra text accompanying note 342.
353. Cf.Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,603-04 (1975) (holding that under certain circumstances, especially if the initial illegality is "purpose[ful] and flagran[t]," not even Miranda
warnings may break the causal connection between an unlawful arrest and a resulting
confession).
354. Justice O'Connor's view that a Mirandaviolation should not beget the same "fruits"
consequences as an infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself, see supratext accompanying
note 201, brings to mind the comments of the Model Code Reporters when they first "attempt[ed] to formulate standards with respect to exclusion of the 'fruits of the poisonous
tree' as it relates to extrinsic evidence derived from inadmissible statements":
[E]specially in the context of a code containing many rigid rules of varying importance,
some by no means of constitutional dimension, it is relevant to the question whether the
"fruits" of a statement should be excluded to inquire whether the underlying violation
which rendered the statement inadmissible involved a grave infringement of the defendant's rights. The more outrageous the violation, the stronger deterrentwe need, and consequently the wider the sweep of the "fruits"doctrine should be If, on the other hand, the
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V. SoMEi FNAL CommIErcrs
Court's decisions
Amar and Lettow miss things in the Supreme
3 55
that are there and see things that are not.
Amar and Lettow seem to be unaware that, for more than thirty
years, the dominant rationale for excluding coerced confessions has
been the Court's disapproval of and attempts to discourage the offensive police methods that produce such confessions, regardless of
their reliability. They do not even cite, let alone discuss, such leading police methods confession cases as Rogers v. Richmond,356 Jackson v. Denno,357 and Colorado v. Connelly.35 8 As a result, one
unfamiliar with the law and literature of coerced confessions would
never know, after reading the Amar-Lettow article, that there is
such a thing as a police methods test for considering the admissibility of confessions.
As we have seen, in Kastigar v. United States359 the Court
adopted the view that protection against the use and derivative use
of compelled utterances and the scope of the privilege are coterminous. Amar and Lettow leave their readers with the impression
360
that what they label the Court's "newfangled immunity rule"
sprang fullgrown from the head of Zeus. They seem unable or unwilling to grasp that this newfangled rule may be regarded as either
(i) a reaffirmation of Counselman's intermediate holding that the
privilege against self-incrimination prohibits the use of evidence derived from compelled testimony as well as the testimony itself, or
(ii) a specific application of the poisonous tree doctrine.
Nowhere do they discuss Counselman's intermediate holding.
Nor do they discuss the poisonous tree doctrine. They do not tell
their readers that the national commission that recommended use
and derivative use immunity and the Congress that enacted it into
law and the Court that approved it in Kastigar all operated on the
premise that the poisonous tree doctrine applies to coerced confesrule violated stands low in our hierarchy of valies, the argument that [the] violation
must be deterred at all costs is considerably less compelling.
MODEL CODE OF PRE-AERAIoNMENT PROCEDURES § 9.09 cmt. at 75-76 (Am. Law Inst.,
Tentative Draft No. 1, 1966) (emphasis added).
355. Cf.Amar, supranote 341, at 758 (discussing the adverse effects of placing the Fourth
Amendment in a criminal procedure course rather than teaching it as part of constitutional
law).
356. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
357. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
358. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
359. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
360. Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 877.
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sions and compelled testimony. Amar and Lettow seem either unable or unwilling to grasp that both Congress and the Kastigar
Court went as far as they did - protection against derivative use because the poisonous tree doctrine went that far, and stopped
where they did - short of absolute immunity against prosecution
because that is where the poisonous tree doctrine stopped.
Kastigar stands squarely in Amar and Lettow's path. I do not
see how that case can be explained or appraised without discussing
the poisonous tree doctrine. Yet Amar and Lettow do just that;
remarkably, they fail to discuss361the American poisonous tree doctrine anywhere in their article.
Amar and Lettow are contending, in essence, either that the
poisonous tree doctrine should not be an intrinsic part of the Fifth
Amendment exclusionary rule, or that the poisonous tree doctrine
should not apply to Fifth Amendment violations as it applies to
other constitutional violations, or both. Yet they never tell their
readers what the rationale is for the poisonous tree doctrine, or why
or how or when the doctrine came about, or what its scope is. At
no point in their article do they cite, let alone discuss, two of the
362
leading, and the two oldest, poisonous tree cases, Silverthorne
363
and Nardone.
As noted earlier, Amar and Lettow rely heavily on Schmerber v.
California.364 But this time they see things that are not there. They
view Schmerber as drawing a sharp line, or at least furnishing support for the drawing of such a line, between compelled words and
their reliable physical fruits. But no evidence in that case was derived from compelled words, because there were no compelled
words. No fruits of police misconduct were involved in Schmerber,
because there was no misconduct.
Schmerber tells us that - absent any antecedent Fifth Amendment violation that enables the government to acquire the evidence
361. The Amar-Lettow article refers to the independent source and inevitable discovery
doctrines, Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 880, 908 n.227, 918-19, 928, but never discusses
how these doctines came to be, or whether they ought to be, exceptions to the more general
poisonous tree doctrine.
362. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 471 (1963); see supranotes 30103 and accompanying text.
363. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); see supra section IV.C. Amar and
Lettow do refer to another leading poisonous tree case, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963), one time (a "But cf." citation in a footnote, Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 917
n.265), but fail to point out that Wong Sun applied the doctrine to exclude two types of
"fruits": (a) statements the defendant made immediately after being illegally arrested and
(b) physical evidence derived from those inadmissible statements. See supra notes 308-13
and accompanying text.
364. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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the acquisition of real or physical evidence does not violate the
privilege. Schmerber does not tell us, and it cannot plausibly be
read as telling us, that the nontestimonial nature of derivative evidence, like some sorcerer's amulet, creates a bubble that envelops
the evidence and shields it from the contamination of unconstitutional police action.
The blood test evidence was admitted in Schmerber, Justice
Brennan was careful to tell us, because it was neither the defendant's "testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act"
by him.3 65 But, relying in part on Schmerber, Amar and Lettow
would admit physical evidence that is derived from a defendant's
compelled "communicative act."
Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion in Schmerber,
spent six pages discussing whether the chemical analysis of the defendant's blood should be excluded "as the product of an unreasonable search and seizure. ' 366 Why would he have bothered if the
withdrawal of blood - or the acquisition of nontestimonial evidence generally - enjoyed a special immunity from the poisonous
tree doctrine?
One might argue that although an antecedent Fourth Amendment violation may fatally taint the acquisition of nontestimonial
evidence, an antecedent Fifth Amendment violation cannot. But
why not? After all, the poisonous tree doctrine applies to violations
of the Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourth.
A year after he wrote the majority opinion in Schmerber, Justice
Brennan, again writing for the Court, applied the poisonous tree
doctrine to a violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel at a pretrial lineup.3 67 He told us that a courtroom identification by a government witness would be allowed if the prosecution
could establish that it was based upon observations of the defendant independent of those at the illegal lineup identification - citing
for authority the Fifth Amendment immunity grant case, Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission.368 This is further evidence that the Court
views the poisonous tree doctrine as a general principle applicable
-

365. 384 U.S. at 765; see also supra text accompanying note 123.
366. 384 U.S. at 767. The Court upheld the admissibility of the chemical analysis only
after concluding that defendant had not been arrested illegally and that it was impractical for
the police to seek a warrant before obtaining a sample of his blood. There is little doubt that
if defendant's Fourth Amendment rights had been violated, the chemical analysis would have
been excluded "as the product of an unconstitutional search and seizure."
367. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
368. See 388 U.S. at 240 (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52 (1964)).
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to various constitutional violations, not a rule limited to the search
and seizure setting.
More recently, the Court applied the poisonous tree doctrine,
and its exceptions, to the fruits of statements obtained in violation
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.369 Once again, the Court
pointed out that the poisonous tree doctrine had not been limited
to violations of the Fourth Amendment. It had, the Court reminded us, been applied as well to violations of the Fifth. For authority, the Court cited two immunity grant cases, Murphy and
Kastigar.370
As we have seen, Amar and Lettow gain much comfort from the
Miranda derivative evidence cases. Here, too, I venture to say, they
see things that are not there. In Michigan v. Tucker37 1 and, a decade later, in Oregon v. Elstad,372 the Court did admit the verbal
fruits of Miranda violations. But both Tucker and Elstad are Miranda cases, not cases "deal[ing] with the constitutional privilege
3 73
against compulsory self-incrimination in its most pristine form.1
The Tucker Court made clear that the underlying police misconduct "did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, but departed only from the prophy374
lactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda."
Thus
"[t]he question for decision" presented in Tucker was "how sweeping the judicially imposed consequences of [a] disregard" of Miranda's "procedural rules" - and "an inadvertent disregard," to
boot - should be.375
Elstad relied heavily on the reasoning in Tucker. "Since there
was no actual infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights" in
Tucker, recalled the Elstad Court, that case "was not controlled by
the doctrine expressed in Wong Sun that fruits of a constitutional
violation must be suppressed." 376 The Elstad Court felt that it was
not bound by the poisonous tree doctrine because, as it perceived
369. See Nix v. Williams (Williams II), 467 U.S. 431 (1984); see also supra text accompa-

nying notes 330-48.
370. See supra text accompanying note 342.
371. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
372. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
373. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979); see also supra text accompanying

note 208. Moreover, for reasons I have discussed at length, I believe Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in Quarles is also an argument for a special rule admitting the physical
fruits of Mirandaviolations. See supra text accompanying notes 180-89.
374. 417 U.S. at 446; see also supra note 66. For other language in the 74cker opinion to
the same effect, see supra note 201.
375. 417 U.S. at 445.

376. 470 U.S. at 308.
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the matter, a victim of a Mirandaviolation "has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm. '377 Added the Court: "If errors are
made by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic
Miranda procedures, they should not breed the same irremediable
consequences as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment
itself."

378

Amar and Lettow maintain that the Court has been "chipping
away" at Kastigar "in the context of Miranda warnings. ' 3 7 9 This is
like saying the courts have been chipping away at Roe v. Wade380 in
the contexts of physician-assisted suicide and active voluntary euthanasia. The more relevant question is whether the Court has
been chipping away at Kastigarin its own bailiwick - in a "pure"
(not "prophylactic") Fifth Amendment context. Amar and Lettow
point to no cases in which the Supreme Court has.
Finally, Amar and Lettow point out that their goal can be
achieved by "an extension of the inevitable discovery doctrine" 381
-

by "simply presumfing] -

irrebuttably -

that somehow, some

way, the truth and the fruit might have come to light anyway. ' '382
This is not an argument, only a conclusion. This is analogous to
saying that abolition of the search and seizure exclusionary rule can
be brought about (i) by simply expanding the doctrine permitting
the use of illegally seized evidence for impeachment purposes until
it engulfs the exclusionary rule itself, or (ii) by simply expandingthe
"standing" requirement so that nobody has standing to challenge
the admissibility of evidence seized in violation of the Constitution,
or (iii) by simply extending the so-called good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule until it applies to all illegal searches and seizures.
Amar and Lettow recognize that "at first glance" their approach
may "seem like a startling break from current interpretations, '383
but they quickly add, "[it is merely an extension of [several] current doctrines or trends."'384 I have given the Amar-Lettow ap-

377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

470 U.S. at 307.
470 U.S. at 309.
Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 880; see also i at 858.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Amar & Lettow, supra note 1, at 928.
Id. at 880.
Id. at 927.
Id.
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proach a second glance - and a third and a fourth. It still looks
like "a startling break from current interpretations" to me.**
** When Professor Kamisar accepted the Law Review's invitation to respond to the
Amar-Lettow article, he understood that he would not be able to reply to Amar and Lettow's
rejoinder to his response.
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